Non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments for QMA, with preprocessing by Coladangelo, Andrea et al.
Non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments for QMA, with
preprocessing
Andrea Coladangelo∗2, Thomas Vidick†1,2, and Tina Zhang‡3
1Department of Computing and Mathematical Sciences, California Institute of Technology
2Institute for Quantum Information and Matter, California Institute of Technology
3Division of Physics, Mathematics and Astronomy, California Institute of Technology
Abstract
A non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof system for a language L ∈ NP allows a
prover (who is provided with an instance x ∈ L, and a witness w for x) to compute a classical
certificate pi for the claim that x ∈ L such that pi has the following properties: 1) pi can be
verified efficiently, and 2) pi does not reveal any information about w, besides the fact that it
exists (i.e. that x ∈ L). NIZK proof systems have recently been shown to exist for all languages
in NP in the common reference string (CRS) model and under the learning with errors (LWE)
assumption.
We initiate the study of NIZK arguments for languages in QMA. An argument system dif-
fers from a proof system in that the honest prover must be efficient, and that it is only sound
against (quantum) polynomial-time provers. Our first main result is the following: if LWE
is hard for quantum computers, then any language in QMA has an NIZK argument with pre-
processing. The preprocessing in our argument system consists of (i) the generation of a CRS
and (ii) a single (instance-independent) quantum message from verifier to prover. Meanwhile, the
instance-dependent phase of our argument system involves only a single classical message from
prover to verifier. Importantly, verification in our protocol is entirely classical, and the verifier
needs not have quantum memory; its only quantum actions are in the preprocessing phase.
NIZK proofs of (classical) knowledge are widely used in the construction of more advanced
cryptographic protocols, and we expect the quantum analogue to likewise find a broad range
of applications. In this respect, the fact that our protocol has an entirely classical verification
phase is particularly appealing.
Our second contribution is to extend the notion of a classical proof of knowledge to the quan-
tum setting. We introduce the notions of arguments and proofs of quantum knowledge (AoQK/PoQK),
and we show that our non-interactive argument system satisfies the definition of an AoQK. In
particular, we explicitly construct an extractor which can recover a quantum witness from any
prover who is successful in our protocol. We also show that any language in QMA has an
(interactive) proof of quantum knowledge, again by exhibiting a particular proof system for all
languages in QMA and constructing an extractor for it. That our NIZK argument system is
also an AoQK further broadens the contexts in which it may be applied.
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1 Introduction
The paradigm of the interactive proof system is commonly studied in cryptography and in com-
plexity theory. Intuitively speaking, an interactive proof system is a protocol in which an un-
bounded prover attempts to convince an efficient verifier that some problem instance x is in some
language L. The verifier represents an entity less computationally powerful or less informed than
the prover; the prover holds some knowledge that the verifier does not (namely, that x ∈ L), and
the prover attempts to convince the verifier of this knowledge. We say that there is an interac-
tive proof system for a language L if the following two conditions are satisfied. Firstly, for any
x ∈ L, there must exist a prover (the ‘honest’ prover) which causes the (honest) verifier to accept
in the protocol with high probability; and secondly, for any x /∈ L, there is no prover which can
cause the honest verifier to accept, except with some small probability. These two conditions are
commonly referred to as the ‘completeness’ and ‘soundness’ conditions. We can also consider
a relaxed soundness condition where, when x /∈ L, we require only that it be computationally
intractable (rather than impossible) to cause the verifier to accept. A protocol satisfying this re-
laxed soundness condition, and which has an efficient honest prover, is known as an interactive
argument system.
Some interactive proof and argument systems satisfy a third property known as zero-knowledge
[GMR85], which captures the informal notion that the verifier (even a dishonest verifier) ‘learns
no new information’ from an interaction with the honest prover, except for the information that
x ∈ L. This idea is formalised through a simulator, which has the same computational powers as
the verifier V does, and can output transcripts that (for x such that x ∈ L) are indistinguishable
from transcripts arising from interactions between V and the honest prover. As such, V intu-
itively ‘learns nothing’, because whatever it might have learned from a transcript it could equally
have generated by itself. The property of zero-knowledge can be perfect (PZK), statistical (SZK) or
computational (CZK). The difference between these three definitions is the extent to which simu-
lated transcripts are indistinguishable from real ones. In a PZK protocol, the simulator’s output
distribution is identical to the distribution of transcripts that the honest prover and (potentially
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dishonest) verifier generate when x ∈ L. In SZK, the two distributions have negligible statistical
distance, and in CZK, they are computationally indistinguishable. In this work we will primarily
be concerned with CZK.
A non-interactive proof system (or argument system) is a protocol in which the prover and the
verifier exchange only a single message that depends on the problem instance x. (In general,
an instance-independent setup phase may be allowed in which the prover and verifier commu-
nicate, with each other or with a trusted third party, in order to establish shared state that is
used during the protocol execution proper. We discuss this in more detail in the following para-
graph.) Non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs and arguments have seen widespread ap-
plication in classical cryptography, often in venues where their interactive counterparts would be
impracticable—including, notably, in CCA-secure public-key cryptosystems [NY90, Sah99], dig-
ital signature schemes [BG90, CP92, BMW03], verifiable delegated computation [PHGR13] and,
recently, a number of blockchain constructions [GGPR13, Com14, Lab17]. A particularly attrac-
tive feature of classical NIZK systems is that they can be amplified in parallel to achieve better
security parameters [BDSMP91], which is in general not true of their interactive (private-coin)
counterparts.
It is known [GO94] that NIZK proofs and arguments in the standard model (namely, the model
where the only assumption is that adversarial entities are computationally efficient) exist only for
languages in BPP. As such, in order to construct NIZK protocols for more interesting languages,
it is customary to consider extended cryptographic models. Examples of these include the common
reference string (CRS) model, in which the verifier and the prover are assumed to begin the pro-
tocol sharing access to a common string sampled from a specified distribution; and the random
oracle (RO) model, in which prover and verifier have access to an efficiently evaluable function
that behaves like a function sampled uniformly at random from the set of possible functions with
some specified, and finite, domain and range. In these extended models, and under certain com-
putational hardness assumptions, non-interactive computational zero-knowledge proof systems
for all languages in NP are known. For instance, Blum, Santis, Micali and Persiano [BDSMP91]
showed in 1990 that NIZK proofs for all languages in NP exist in the CRS model, assuming that
the problem of quadratic residuosity is computationally intractable.
At this point, a natural question arises: what happens in the quantum setting? Ever since Shor’s
algorithm for factoring [Sho95] was published in 1995, it has been understood that the introduc-
tion of quantum computers would render a wide range of cryptographic protocols insecure. For
example, quadratic residuosity is known to be solvable in polynomial time by quantum comput-
ers. Given that this is so, it is natural to ask the following question: in the presence of quantum
adversaries, is it still possible to obtain proof systems for all languages in NP that are complete
and sound, and if it is, in which extended models is it feasible? This question has been studied in
recent years. For example, Unruh showed in [Unr15] that quantum-resistant NIZK proof systems
for all languages in NP exist in the quantum random oracle (QRO) model, a quantum generali-
sation of the random oracle model. More recently, Peikert and Shiehian [PS19] achieved a more
direct analogue of Blum et al.’s result, by showing that NIZK proofs for all languages in NP exist
in the CRS model, assuming that learning with errors (LWE)—a problem believed to be difficult
for quantum computers—is computationally intractable. 1
1Peikert and Shiehan construct, based on LWE, a NI(C)ZK proof system in the common reference string model, and
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However, the advent of large-scale quantum computers would not only render some cryptosys-
tems insecure; it would also provide us with computational powers that extend those of our cur-
rent classical machines, and give rise to new cryptographic tasks that were never considered in the
classical literature. A second natural question which arises in the presence of quantum computers
is the following: in which models is it possible to obtain a NIZK proof or argument system not
only for all languages in NP, but for all languages in ‘quantum NP’ (i.e. QMA)? Loosely speaking,
NIZK protocols for NP languages allow the prover to prove any statement that can be checked effi-
ciently by a classical verifier who is given a classical witness. A NIZK protocol for QMA languages
would, analogously, allow the prover to prove to the verifier (in a non-interactive, zero-knowledge
way) the veracity of statements that require a quantum witness and quantum computing power
to check. To our knowledge, the question of achieving NIZK protocols for QMA has not yet been
studied. In 2016, Broadbent, Ji, Song and Watrous [BJSW16] exhibited a zero-knowledge proof
system for QMA with an efficient honest prover, but their protocol requires both quantum and
classical interaction.
In this work, our first contribution is to propose a non-interactive (computational) zero-knowledge
argument system for all languages in QMA, based on the hardness of LWE, in which both verifier
and prover are quantum polynomial time. The model we consider is the CRS (common reference
string) model, augmented by a single message of (quantum) preprocessing. (The preprocessing
consists of an instance-independent quantum message from the verifier to the prover.) The post-
setup single message that the prover sends to the verifier, after it receives the witness, is classical;
the post-setup verifier is also entirely classical; and, if we allow the prover and verifier to share
EPR pairs a priori, as in a model previously considered by Kobayashi [Kob02], we can also make
the verifier’s preprocessing message classical. Like classical NIZK protocols, our protocol shows
itself to be receptive to parallel repetition (see section 4.4), which allows us to amplify soundness
concurrently without affecting zero-knowledge. Our model and our assumptions are relatively
standard ones which can be fruitfully compared with those which have been studied in the clas-
sical setting. As such, this result provides an early benchmark of the kinds of assumptions under
which NIZK can be achieved for languages in QMA.
Our second contribution is to show that our protocol also satisfies a notion of argument of quantum
knowledge. In the classical setting, some proof systems and argument systems for NP languages
satisfy a stronger notion of soundness wherein a witness can be extracted from any prover P who
convinces the verifier to accept with high probability. More formally, in such a setting, there is
an extractor machine which—given black-box access to any P who convinces the verifier to accept
with high probability (on the input x)—is able to efficiently compute a witness w that testifies that
the problem instance x is in the language L. Such protocols are known as proofs and arguments
of knowledge (PoK and AoK). Intuitively speaking, the notion of PoK/AoK is a framework for
describing situations where the prover is not necessarily more powerful, but only better informed,
than the verifier. In these situations, the prover possesses knowledge (the witness w, which could
represent a password or some other form of private information) that the verifier does not; and the
a NI(S)ZK argument system in the common random string model. They do not explicitly consider the applications of
either result to the quantum setting. We show, however, for our own purposes, that the latter of these results generalises
to quantum adversaries. In other words, we show (in section 2.5.3) that the Peikert-Shiehan NIZK argument system in
the common random string model is adaptively sound against quantum adversaries and adaptively (quantum compu-
tational) zero-knowledge.
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prover wishes to convince the verifier, possibly in a zero-knowledge way (i.e. without revealing
sensitive information), that it indeed ‘knows’ or ‘possesses’ the witness w (so that it might, for
example, be granted access to its password-protected files, or cash a quantum cheque). The idea
of a machine ‘knowing’ some witness w is formalised by the existence of the extractor.
Until now, the witness w has always been classical, and the notion of a proof of quantum knowl-
edge (PoQK) has not been formally defined or studied. In this paper, we firstly formulate a defi-
nition for a PoQK that is analogous to the classical definition of a PoK2, and we show that there
exists a (interactive) PoQK for any language in QMA3. Secondly, we introduce the notion of an
argument of quantum knowledge (AoQK), and we prove that our NIZK protocol for QMA is also
(under this definition) a zero-knowledge argument of quantum knowledge. We present our def-
inition of a PoQK in section 2.6. There are two main difficulties in extending the classical notion
of a PoK to the quantum setting. The first is that we must precisely specify how the extractor
should be permitted to interact with the successful (quantum) prover. For this, we borrow the
formalism of quantum interactive machines that Unruh [Unr12] uses in defining quantum proofs
of classical knowledge. The second difficulty is to give an appropriate definition of success for the
extractor. In the classical setting, the NP relation R which defines the set of witnesses w for a prob-
lem instance x is binary: a string w is either a witness or it is not. In the quantum setting, on the
other hand—unlike in the classical case, in which any witness is as good as any other—different
witnesses might be accepted with different probabilities by some verification circuit Q under con-
sideration. In other words, some witnesses may be of better ‘quality’ than others. In addition,
because QMA is a probabilistic class, the choice of Q (which is analogous to the choice of the NP
relation R) is more obviously ambiguous than it is in the classical case. Different (and equally
valid) choices of verifiers Q for a particular language L ∈ QMA might have different probabilities
of accepting a candidate witness ρ on a particular instance x. In our definition, we define a ‘QMA
relation’ with respect to a fixed choice of verifying circuit (family) Q; we define the ‘quality’ of a
candidate witness ρ for x to be the probability that Q accepts (x, ρ); and we require that the suc-
cessful extractor returns a witness whose quality lies strictly above the soundness parameter for
the QMA relation.
Since we show that our protocol is a NIZK argument of quantum knowledge under our new
definition, it can be used in settings where a prover wishes to prove it ‘knows’ or ‘possesses’ a
quantum state. For example, this state could be a quantum money state [Wie83]. Suppose that
the prover participated in the appropriate setup phase with the bank when the quantum money
state was minted. Later on, using our protocol, the prover could—by sending a single classical
message, which can be processed classically—demonstrate to the bank that it still possesses that
quantum banknote, allowing the prover to cash a quantum cheque or transfer quantum funds.4
The fact that our protocol is an argument of quantum knowledge means that, when it is used in this
way (i.e. in the place of a more traditional quantum money verification protocol), it preserves
(computationally speaking) the anti-counterfeiting security properties that are central to quantum
money. Another example is a history state for a certain computation. Suppose that the prover
2This definition is joint work with Broadbent and Grilo
3This result is also obtained in independent and concurrent work of Broadbent and Grilo.
4For this to be possible, the prover needs to be provided with a homomorphic encryption of a classical description of
the quantum money state. In the case of Wiesner’s scheme [Wie83], this is a Hamiltonian that is already in the Clifford
form required for our protocol.
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is a server to which the verifier wishes to delegate a quantum task, and that the prover and the
verifier complete the setup phase of our protocol when the delegation occurs. After the setup
phase is complete, the verifier does not need to preserve any quantum information, meaning that it could
perform the setup phase using borrowed quantum resources, and thereafter return to the classical
world. When it receives the prover’s single-message zero-knowledge proof, the verifier can verify
the computation without performing any additional quantum operations—a property that our
protocol shares with protocols that have purely classical verification, such as Mahadev’s classical-
verifier argument system for QMA [Mah18]. An advantage of our protocol, however, is that the
server can free the quantum memory associated with the verifier’s computation immediately after
the computation terminates, rather than holding the history state until the verifier is available to
perform the verification.
The interactive protocol from [BJSW16]
Our protocol is inspired by the protocol exhibited in [BJSW16], which can be summarized as fol-
lows. (For a more detailed exposition, see section 2.2.)
1. The verifier and the prover begin with an instance x of some interesting problem, the latter
of which is represented by a (promise) language L = (Lyes, Lno) ∈ QMA. The prover wishes
to prove to the verifier that x ∈ Lyes. The first step is to map x to an instance H of the QMA-
complete local Clifford Hamiltonian problem. In the case that x is a yes instance, i.e. x ∈ Lyes,
the prover, who receives a witness state |Φ〉 for x as auxiliary input, performs the efficient
transformation that turns the witness |Φ〉 for x into a witness |Ψ〉 for H. (The chief property
that witnesses |Ψ〉 for H have is that 〈Ψ|H |Ψ〉 is small—smaller than a certain threshold—
which, rephrased in physics terminology, means that 〈Ψ| has low energy with respect to H.)
The prover then sends an encoding of |Ψ〉 to the verifier (under a specified authentication
code which doubly functions as an encryption scheme). The prover also commits to the secret
key of the authentication code.
2. The Clifford Hamiltonian H to which x has been mapped can be written as a sum of polyno-
mially many terms of the form C∗ |0k〉 〈0k|C, where C is a Clifford unitary. (This is the origin
of the name ‘Clifford Hamiltonian’.) The verifier chooses a string r uniformly at random.
r plays a role analogous to that of the verifier’s choice of edge to check in the 3-colouring
zero-knowledge protocol introduced by [GMR85]: intuitively, r determines the verifier’s
challenge to the prover. Each r corresponds to one of the terms C∗r |0k〉 〈0k|Cr of the Clifford
Hamiltonian.
The verifier then measures the term C∗r |0k〉 〈0k|Cr on the encoded witness (this can be done
‘homomorphically’ through the encoding). The outcome z obtained by the verifier can be
thought of as an encoding of the true measurement outcome, the latter of which should
be small (i.e. correspond to low energy) if |Ψ〉 is a true witness. The verifier sends z (its
measurement outcomes) and r (its choice of Hamiltonian term) back the prover.
3. Finally, using a zero-knowledge NP proof system,5 the prover provides an (interactive) ZK
proof for the following NP statement: there exists an opening to its earlier (perfectly bind-
5It is known that there are quantumly sound and quantumly zero-knowledge proof systems for NP: see [Wat09].
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ing) commitment such that, if the verifier had the opened encoding keys, it would accept.
This is an NP statement because the witness string is the encoding keys. Proving that the
verifier ‘would accept’ amounts to proving that the verifier’s measurement outcomes z, de-
coded under the keys which were committed to earlier, would correspond to a low-energy
outcome. Because the proof that the prover provides is zero-knowledge, the verifier learns
nothing substantial from this exchange, but it becomes convinced that it should accept.
In the protocol from [BJSW16], it is critical to soundness that the prover sends the encoding of the
witness to the verifier before the verifier chooses r. The zero-knowledge property holds because
the encoding that the prover applies to the witness state functions like an authenticated encryp-
tion scheme: its encryption-like properties prevent the verifier from learning anything substantial
about the witness while handling the encoded state, and its authentication code–like properties
ensure that the verifier cannot deviate very far from its honest behaviour.
Our non-interactive protocol
We wish to make the protocol from [BJSW16] non-interactive. To start with, we can replace the
prover’s proof in step 3 with a NIZK proof in the CRS model. NIZK proofs for all languages in
NP have recently been shown to exist [CLW19, PS19] based on the hardness of LWE only, and we
prove that the Peikert-Shiehian construction from [PS19] remains secure (i.e. quantum computa-
tionally sound and zero-knowledge) against quantum adversaries, assuming that LWE is quan-
tum computationally intractable. However, the more substantial obstacle to making the [BJSW16]
protocol non-interactive is the following: in order to do away with the verifier’s message in step 2,
it seems that the prover would have to somehow predict z (the verifier’s measurement outcomes)
and send a NIZK proof corresponding to this z. Unfortunately, in order for the authentication
code to work, the number of possible outcomes z has to be exponentially large (and thus the
prover cannot provide a NIZK proof of consistency for each possible outcome). Even allowing for
an instance-independent preprocessing step between the verifier and the prover, it is unclear how
this impasse could be resolved.
Our first main idea is to use quantum teleportation. We add an instance-independent preprocessing
step in which the verifier creates a number of EPR pairs and sends half of each to the prover. We
then have the verifier (prematurely) make her measurement from step 2 during the preprocessing
step (and hence independently of the instance!), and send the measurement outcomes z to the prover.
Once x is revealed, the prover teleports the encoded witness to the verifier, and sends the verifier
the teleportation outcomes d, along with a commitment to his encoding keys. The prover then
provides an NIZK proof of an opening to the committed keys such that d, z and the encoding
keys are consistent with a low-energy outcome. The hope is that, because the prover’s and the
verifier’s actions commute (at least when the prover is honest), this protocol will be, in some
sense, equivalent to one where the prover firstly teleports the witness, then the verifier makes
the measurements, and finally the prover sends a NIZK proof. This latter protocol would be
essentially equivalent to the [BJSW16] protocol.
There are three main issues with this strategy:
1. In the preprocessing step, the verifier does not yet know what the instance x (and hence
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what the Clifford Hamiltonian) is. Thus, she cannot measure the term C∗r |0k〉 〈0k|Cr, as she
would have done in what we have called step 2 of the protocol from [BJSW16].
2. The second issue is that the verifier cannot communicate her choice of r in the preprocessing
step in the clear. If she does, the prover will easily be able to cheat by teleporting a state that
passes the check for the rth Hamiltonian term, but that would not pass the check for any
other term.
3. The third issue is a bit more subtle. If the prover knows the verifier’s measurement outcomes
z before he teleports the witness state to the verifier, he can misreport the teleportation out-
comes d, and make a clever choice of d such that d, z and the committed keys are consistent
with a low-energy outcome even when he does not possess a genuine witness.
The first issue is resolved by considering the (instance-independent) verifying circuit Q for the
QMA language L (recall that Q takes as input both an instance x and a witness state), and mapping
Q itself to a Clifford Hamiltonian H(Q). (For comparison, in the protocol from [BJSW16], it is the
circuit Q(x, ·) which is mapped to a Clifford Hamiltonian.) In the instance-dependent step, the
prover will be asked to teleport a “history state” corresponding to the execution of the circuit Q
on input (x, |Ψ〉), where |Ψ〉 is a witness for the instance x. In the preprocessing step, the verifier
will measure a uniformly random term from H(Q), and will also perform a special measurement
(with some probability) which is meant to certify that the prover put the correct instance x into Q
when it was creating the history state. Of course, the verifier does not know x at the time of this
measurement, but she will know x at the point where she needs to verify the prover’s NIZK proof.
Our second main idea, which addresses the second and the third issues above (at the price of
downgrading our proof system to an argument system), is to have the prover compute his NIZK
proof homomorphically. During the preprocessing step, we have the verifier send the prover a (com-
putationally hiding) commitment σ to her choice of r; and, in addition, we ask the verifier to send
the prover a homomorphic encryption of r, of the randomness s used to commit to σ, and of her
measurement outcomes z. At the beginning of the instance-dependent step, the prover receives
a witness |Ψ〉 for the instance x. During the instance-dependent step, and after having received
the verifier’s ciphertexts in the preprocessing step, we ask the prover firstly to commit to some
choice of encoding keys, and then to teleport to the verifier (an encoding of) the history state
corresponding to the execution of Q on input (x, |Ψ〉). Let d be the outcome of the teleportation
measurements. After the prover has committed to his encoding keys, we ask the prover to ho-
momorphically encrypt d and his encoding keys, and homomorphically run the following circuit:
check that r, s is a valid opening to σ, and (using the properties of the authentication code) check
also that the verifier performed the honest measurement during preprocessing. If all the checks
pass, then the prover homomorphically computes an NIZK proof that there exist encoding keys
consistent with his commitment such that these keys, together with r, z, d, indicate that the veri-
fier’s measurement result was a low-energy outcome. The homomorphic encryption safeguards
the verifier against a malicious prover who may attempt to take advantage of knowing r, or of the
freedom to cleverly choose d, in order to pass in the protocol without holding a genuine witness.
In summary, the structure of our protocol is as follows. Let Q be a QMA verification circuit,
and let H(Q) be the Clifford Hamiltonian obtained from Q by performing a circuit-to-Clifford-
Hamiltonian reduction.
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1. (preprocessing step) The verifier creates a (sufficiently large) number of EPR pairs, and divides
them into ‘her halves’ and ‘the prover’s halves’. She interprets her halves as the qubits mak-
ing up (an encoding of) a history state generated from an evaluation of the circuit Q. Then,
the verifier samples r (her ‘challenge’) uniformly at random, and according to its value, does
one of two things: either she measures a uniformly random term of H(Q) on ‘her halves’ of
the EPR pairs, or she makes a special measurement (on her halves of the EPR pairs) whose
results will allow her later to verify that the circuit Q was evaluated on the correct instance x.
Following this, the verifier samples a public-key, secret-key pair (pk, sk) for a homomorphic
encryption scheme. She sends the prover:
(a) pk;
(b) the ‘prover’s halves’ of the EPR pairs;
(c) a commitment to her choice of challenge, r;
(d) homomorphic encryptions of
i. r,
ii. the randomness s used in the commitment, and
iii. the measurement outcomes z.
2. (instance-dependent step) Upon receiving x, and a witness |Ψ〉, the prover computes the ap-
propriate history state, and samples encoding keys. Then, he teleports an encoding of the
history state to the verifier using the half EPR pairs that he previously received from her. Let
d be the teleportation measurement outcomes. The prover sends to the verifier:
(a) d;
(b) a commitment, σ, to his encoding keys;
(c) a homomorphic encryption of a NIZK proof (homomorphically computed) of the exis-
tence of an opening to σ such that the opened keys, together with d, z, r, are consistent
with a low-energy outcome.
Analysis
Our protocol is a non-interactive, zero-knowledge argument system in the CRS model with a one-
message preprocessing step. It is straightforward to see that the protocol satisfies completeness.
Intuitively, soundness follows from the fact that the encryptions the prover receives in the prepro-
cessing step should be indistinguishable (assuming the prover is computationally bounded) from
encryptions of the zero string. As such, the encryptions of z, r, s (and the commitment to r) cannot
possibly be helping the prover in guessing r or in selecting a false teleportation measurement out-
come d′ which makes z, r, d′ and the authentication keys consistent with a low-energy outcome.
Soundness then essentially reduces to soundness of the protocol in [BJSW16].
The zero-knowledge property follows largely from the properties of the protocol in [BJSW16] that
allowed Broadbent, Ji, Song and Watrous to achieve zero-knowledge. One key difference is that,
in order to avoid rewinding the (quantum) verifier, the authors of [BJSW16] use the properties
of an interactive coin-flipping protocol to allow the efficient simulator to recover the string r (recall
that r determines the verifier’s challenge) with probability 1. (The traditional alternative to this
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strategy is to have the simulator guess r, and rewind the verifier if it guessed incorrectly in order
to guess again. This is typical in classical proofs of zero-knowledge [GMR85]. However, because
quantum rewinding [Wat09] is more delicate, the authors of [BJSW16] avoid it for simplicity.) As
our protocol is non-interactive, we are unable to take the same approach. Instead, we ask the veri-
fier to choose r and commit to it using a commitment scheme with a property we call extractability.
Intuitively, extractability means that the commitment scheme takes a public key determined by the
CRS. We then show that the simulator can efficiently recover r from the verifier’s commitment
by taking advantage of the CRS. For a candidate LWE-based extractable commitment scheme, see
section 2.3.2.
Another subtlety, unique to homomorphic encryption, is that the verifier may learn something
about the homomorphic computations performed by the prover (and hence possibly about the
encoding keys) by looking at the encryption randomness in the encryption (of an NIZK proof) that
the prover sends the verifier. (Recall that the verifier possesses the decryption key sk for the homo-
morphic encryption scheme.) This leads us to require the use of a fully homomorphic encryption
scheme which satisfies the property of circuit privacy. For a definition of this property, see section
2.3.1.
A non-interactive argument of quantum knowledge
One desirable feature of our non-interactive argument system is that it is also an argument of quan-
tum knowledge. As we mentioned earlier, one of our contributions is to generalize the definitions of
PoKs and AoKs for NP-relations to definitions of PoKs and AoKs for QMA relations. In the latter
setting, the prover wishes to convince the verifier that he ‘knows’ or ‘possesses’ the quantum wit-
ness for an instance of a QMA problem. In order to show that our protocol satisfies this additional
property, we need to exhibit an extractor that, for any yes instance x, and given quantum oracle
access to any prover that is accepted with high probability in our protocol, outputs a quantum
state which is a witness for x. In section 6, we explicitly construct such an extractor K for our non-
interactive protocol. The intuition is the following. K (the extractor) has oracle access to a prover
P∗, and it simulates an execution of the protocol between P∗ and the honest verifier V. We show
that, if P∗ is accepted in our protocol with sufficiently high probability, then it must send V (and
hence K) the encoding ρ˜ of a witness state, and a commitment σ to the encoding keys. If K knew
the encoding keys, it would be able to decode ρ˜, but it is not clear a priori how K could obtain such
keys. Crucially, the same feature of our protocol that allows the zero-knowledge simulator to extract
r from the verifier’s commitment to r also plays in K’s favour: when K simulates an execution of
the protocol, it samples a common reference string which is given to both V and P∗, and in our
protocol, the CRS contains a public key which P∗ uses to make his commitment. As such, in order
to extract a witness from P∗, the extractor samples a CRS containing a public key pk for which
it knows the corresponding secret key sk, and provides this particular CRS as input to P∗. Then,
when K receives ρ˜ and σ from P∗, it is able to extract the committed keys from σ, and use these to
decode ρ˜.
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An interactive proof of quantum knowledge
Our non-interactive protocol is an argument system, which means that it is sound only against com-
putationally bounded provers. In Section 7, we add a separate but complementary result to our
NIZK argument (of knowledge) for QMA by showing that the zero-knowledge proof system for
QMA exhibited in [BJSW16] (with some minor modifications) is also a proof of quantum knowledge.
Open questions
One of the intriguing properties of our protocol is that it is both computationally sound and com-
putationally zero-knowledge. It would be interesting to obtain a non-interactive protocol with
a similarly simple preprocessing phase for which at least one of these properties (soundness or
zero-knowledge) can be shown to hold information-theoretically. (This is the case for the NIZK
proof for NP languages from [PS19]: the authors show that it is possible to obtain both NI(S)ZK
arguments and NI(C)ZK proofs from LWE assumptions.)
It is also interesting to ask how far our preprocessing phase could be weakened or modified. Our
protocol is non-interactive in the CRS model with a single message of quantum preprocessing. In the
classical literature, a broad variety of models for achieving NIZK exists, and it seems plausible
that the potential for variety in the quantum setting is even higher. It might be fruitful to ask: in
which other models can NIZK for QMA be achieved? In particular, is it possible to weaken our
preprocessing phase (while minimally perturbing the other desirable properties of our scheme,
including the fact that the instance-dependent phase only involves classical communication and
classical verification) so that all the information generated during the preprocessing phase is—
like the CRS—generated by a trusted entity, and shared by this trusted entity with both prover
and verifier?
The technique we proposed to remove interaction from the protocol of [BJSW16] is based on two
main ingredients: the use of quantum teleportation, which allows the verifier to anticipate her
measurements of the state she receives from the prover in the instance-dependent step, and the use
of classical homomorphic encryption to allow the prover to demonstrate (homomorphically) that
he has performed a certain computation correctly. These two ingredients work in tandem to ensure
that the soundness and the zero-knowledge property of the [BJSW16] protocol are preserved. We
believe that this technique could find use more broadly, and that it is potentially applicable as a
general transformation to any 3-message protocol in which the prover’s first message is a quantum
state. We leave a more thorough investigation of this as a possible direction for future work.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
For an integer ` ≥ 1, [`] denotes the set {1, . . . , `}. We use poly(n) and negl(n) to denote an
arbitrary polynomial and negligible function of n respectively (a negligible function f is any com-
putable function such that f (n)q(n) →n→∞ 0 for all polynomials q). For an integer d ≥ 1, D(Cd)
denotes the set of density matrices on Cd, i.e. positive semidefinite ρ on Cd such that Tr(ρ) = 1.
For a set S and an element s ∈ S, we write s $←− S to mean that s is sampled uniformly at random
from S. For an integer l, we denote by {0, 1}≤l the set of binary strings of length at most l. We use
the notation SN to denote the set of all permutations of a set of N elements.
We use the terminology PPT for probabilistic polynomial time and QPT for quanutm polynomial time
to describe algorithms; formally, a PPT (resp. QPT) procedure A is a uniformly generated fam-
ily {An} of classical (resp. quantum) polynomial-size circuits such that An takes classical (resp.
quantum) inputs of length poly(n).
2.2 The [BJSW16] protocol
The following exposition is taken from [VZ19].
In [BJSW16], Broadbent, Ji, Song and Watrous describe a protocol involving a quantum polynomial-
time verifier and an unbounded prover, interacting quantumly, which constitutes a zero-knowledge
proof system for languages in QMA. (Although it is sound against arbitrary provers, the system in
fact only requires an honest prover who is provided with a single witness state to perform quan-
tum polynomial-time computations.) We summarise the steps of their protocol below. For details
and fuller explanations, we refer the reader to [BJSW16, Section 3].
Notation. Let L be any language in QMA. For a definition of the k-local Clifford Hamiltonian prob-
lem, see [BJSW16, Section 2]. The k-local Clifford Hamiltonian problem (with exponentially small
ground state energy) is QMA-complete for k = 5; therefore, for all possible inputs x, there exists
a 5-local Clifford Hamiltonian H (which can be computed efficiently from x) whose terms are all
operators of the form C∗ |0k〉 〈0k|C for some Clifford operator C, and such that
1. if x ∈ L, the ground energy of H is ≤ 2−p,
2. if x /∈ L, the ground energy of H is ≥ 1q ,
for some positive integers p and q which are bounded above by polynomials in |x|.
Parties. The proof system involves
1. A verifier, who implements a quantum polynomial-time procedure;
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2. A prover, who is unbounded, but who is only required by the protocol to implement a quan-
tum polynomial-time procedure.
The verifier and the prover communicate quantumly.
Inputs.
1. Input to the verifier:
(a) The Hamiltonian H.
(b) A quantum computationally concealing, perfectly binding (classical) commitment pro-
tocol. In this section, we refer to the commitment algorithm from this protocol as com-
mit; commit(µ, s) takes as input a message µ and a random string s and produces a
commitment string z.
(c) A proof system for NP sound against arbitrary quantum provers.
2. Input to the prover:
(a) The Hamiltonian H.
(b) The n-qubit quantum state ρ, where ρ is a ground state of the Hamiltonian H.
(c) A quantum computationally concealing, perfectly binding (classical) commitment pro-
tocol.
(d) A proof system for NP sound against arbitrary quantum provers.
Protocol.
1. The prover’s encoding step. The prover applies the following encoding to the witness state ρ.
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Auth.Enc:
Parameters: N(·), a polynomially bounded function in |x|. (N functions as a security parameter.)
Input: An m-qubit state ρ.
The prover firstly applies a concatenated Steane code (which maps every one qubit to N(|x|)
qubits) to each qubit in ρ. (For details on the concatenated Steane code, see [BJSW16, Appendix
A.6]. It will be important to Broadbent et al.’s purposes, and ours, that this code admits
transversal applications of Clifford operations.) It then executes the following steps:
(a) Concatenate N trap qubits to the end of each logical qubit (alternatively, to the end of each
N-qubit block) in the result of applying the concatenated Steane code to ρ. Each trap qubit is
initialised uniformly at random to one of |0〉 , |+〉 , |+y〉. (|+y〉 here refers to the state
1√
2
(|0〉+ i |1〉).) Denote the string that records the choices of trap qubits for all m logical
qubits by t = t1, . . . , tN ∈ {|0〉 , |+〉 , |+y〉}mN .
(b) Permute each 2N-tuple of qubits in the result of (a) according to a uniformly random
permutation pi ∈ S2N . (Note that the same permutation pi is applied to every 2N-tuple.)
(c) Apply a Pauli one-time pad XaZb, for uniformly random a, b ∈ {0, 1}2mN , to the entire
2mN-qubit state.
Figure 1: The authentication code
We refer to t,pi, a, b as ‘the authentication keys’ or ‘the encoding keys’.
The prover’s encoding applied to ρ is denoted by E(ρ), and the procedure E is fully de-
termined by the encoding key (t,pi, a, b) which the prover chose to use. At this point, the
prover sends the state E(ρ) to the verifier, along with a commitment (using some perfectly
binding, computationally concealing classical commitment protocol) to the tuple (pi, a, b).
(A commitment to the sequence of trap qubits t is unnecessary because, in a sense, the trap
qubits exist only to check the verifier.) Let the prover’s commitment string be denoted z.
2. Coin-flipping protocol. The prover and the verifier execute a coin-flipping protocol, choosing
a string r of fixed length uniformly at random. This random string r determines a local
Hamiltonian term Hr = C∗r |0k〉 〈0k|Cr that is to be tested. (This step can be implemented
[?] using the same classical commitment protocol that the prover employed in the previous
step.)
3. Verifier’s challenge. The verifier applies the Clifford Cr transversally to the qubits on which
the k-local Hamiltonian term Hr acts nontrivially, and measures them in the standard basis.
It then sends the measurement results ui1 , . . . , uik which it obtained to the prover. (Each ui is
a 2N-bit string, and i1, . . . , ik are the indices of the logical qubits on which the term Hr acts
nontrivially.)
4. Prover’s response. The prover receives the verifier’s measurement results u, and firstly checks
whether they cause a predicate Q˜(t,pi, a, b, r, u) to be satisfied. (We will explain the predicate
Q˜ in more detail shortly. Intuitively, Q˜ is satisfied if and only if both verifier and prover
behaved honestly. Note that we have used the notation Q˜ to represent this predicate, while
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the authors of [BJSW16] simply call it Q. We add the tilde in order to differentiate their
predicate from our predicate Q, the latter of which we define in Definition 3.5.) If Q˜ is not
satisfied, the prover aborts, causing the verifier to reject. If Q˜ is satisfied, then the prover
proves to the verifier, using an NP zero-knowledge protocol, that there exists randomness sP
and an encoding key (t,pi, a, b) such that z = commit((pi, a, b), sP) and Q˜(t,pi, a, b, r, u) = 1.
We now describe the predicate Q˜ in precise terms. For convenience, Broadbent et al. define a
predicate R˜r, which represents the prover’s check after it reverses the effects on u of the one-time
pad XaZb, and then proceed to define Q˜ in terms of R˜r. (As with Q, we denote the predicate
found in [BJSW16] by R˜r instead of Rr, in order to differentiate it from our Rr, which we define in
Definition 3.2.) We quote below the definition of R˜r used in [BJSW16]. (Note that we have altered
their notation slightly: the strings that they call yi and zi we have called pi and qi, and the strings
that they call c and d we have called e and f , to avoid conflicts.)
Definition 2.1 (Definition of R˜r). Let ui1 , . . . , uik be the measurement results that the verifier sent to
the prover in step 3. For each i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik}, define strings pi, qi in {0, 1}N such that pi(pi‖qi) = ui
(alternatively: pi−1(ui) = pi‖qi). The predicate R˜r(t,pi, u) takes the value 1 if and only if the following
two conditions are met:
1. pi ∈ DN for every i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik}, and pi ∈ D1N for at least one index i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik}. (DN =
D0N ∪ D1N is the set of all valid classical N-bit codewords of the concatenated Steane code. We note,
as an aside, that D0N and D1N are both sets of size 8t, where t is an even positive integer such that
7t = N; as such, DN is polynomially sized.)
2. 〈qi1 · · · qik |C⊗nr |ti1 · · · tik〉 6= 0.
Here |ti1 · · · tik〉 is the state of mN qubits obtained by tensoring |0〉 , |+〉 and |+y〉 in the natural
way.
Now we define the predicate Q˜(t,pi, a, b, r, u) in terms of R˜r:
Definition 2.2 (Definition of Q˜). Let e1, . . . , em, f1, . . . , fm ∈ {0, 1}2N be the unique strings such that
C⊗2Nr (Xa1 Zb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xam Zbm) = α(Xe1 Z f1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xem Z fm)C⊗2Nr ,
for some α ∈ {1, i,−1,−i}. (It is possible to efficiently compute e = e1, . . . , em and f = f1, . . . , fm given
a, b and Cr.) The predicate Q˜ is defined by
Q˜(t,pi, a, b, r, u) = R˜r(t,pi, u⊕ ei1 · · · eik) .
Definition 2.3. For notational convenience, we define a quantum procedure Dect,pi,a,b on a 2nN-qubit state
ρ as follows:
1. Apply XaZb to ρ, to obtain a state ρ′.
2. Apply pi−1 to each 2N-qubit block in the state ρ′, to obtain a state ρ′′.
3. Discard the last N qubits of each 2N-qubit block in ρ′′, to obtain a state ρ′′′.
4. Return ρ′′′.
Intuitively, we think of Dect,pi,a,b as an inverse to the prover’s encoding procedure E.
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2.3 Cryptographic primitives
2.3.1 Homomorphic encryption (with circuit privacy)
The following definitions are taken (with modifications) from [BDPMW16].
A homomorphic encryption scheme FHE = (FHE.Gen,FHE.Enc,FHE.Dec,FHE.Eval) is a quadru-
ple of PPT algorithms which operate as follows:
• FHE.Gen(1λ): given the security parameter λ, outputs a secret key sk, a public key pk and an
evaluation key evk.
• FHE.Enc(pk, µ): using the public key pk, encrypts a message µ ∈ {0, 1} into a ciphertext c
and outputs c.
• FHE.Dec(sk, c): using the secret key sk, decrypts a ciphertext c to recover a message µ ∈
{0, 1}.
• FHE.Eval(evk, f , c1, . . . , c`): using the evaluation key evk, applies a function f : {0, 1}` →
{0, 1} to ciphertexts c1, . . . , c` and outputs a ciphertext c f .
Evaluation correctness. We say that the FHE.Eval algorithm correctly evaluates all functions in F
if, for any function f ∈ F : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} and respective inputs x1, . . . , x` ∈ {0, 1} it holds that
Pr[FHE.Dec(sk,FHE.Eval(evk, f , c1, . . . , c`)) = f (x1, . . . , x`)] = 1− negl(λ) ,
where (pk, sk, evk)← FHE.Gen(1λ) and ci ← FHE.Enc(pk, xi).
Semantic security. We say that FHE is semantically secure (or IND-CPA secure) if no PPT adver-
sary A can distinguish between the encryptions of two plaintexts which it is allowed to specify.
More formally, let (pk, sk, evk) ← FHE.Gen(1λ) and Ob(µ0, µ1) = FHE.Enc(pk, µb) for b ∈ {0, 1}.
Then FHE is IND-CPA secure if∣∣∣Pr[AO0(1λ) = 1]− Pr[AO1(1λ) = 1] = negl(λ) ,
where the probability is taken over the internal coins of FHE.Gen, FHE.Enc and A.
Levelled FHE. A fully homomorphic encryption scheme FHE is levelled if
1. FHE.Gen takes an additional parameter 1L, and
2. F (the set of functions which can be correctly evaluated using evk) is restricted to functions
that can be expressed as branching programs of depth at most L.
We implicitly assume, in the text of this paper, that FHE is levelled; the restriction on program
depth can be handled by choosing L to be a sufficiently large polynomial in λ such that ‘overflow’
will not occur.
Circuit privacy. For the protocol described in section 3, we require an additional property of FHE
known as circuit privacy. We formalise the property of circuit privacy in the existence of a fifth PPT
algorithm, FHE.Refresh, which operates as follows:
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• FHE.Refresh(pk, evk, c): takes a ciphertext c, and outputs another ciphertext c′ such that
FHE.Dec(sk, c) = FHE.Dec(sk, c′)
We say that FHE is a scheme with circuit privacy if there exists a PPT algorithm Enc∗ (not to be
confused with FHE.Enc) such that, for any branching program Π of length L = poly(λ) on `
variables, and any x1, . . . , x` ∈ {0, 1}, the following holds:(
FHE.Refresh
(
FHE.Eval(evk,Π, c1, . . . , c`)
)
, c1, . . . , c`, 1, pk, sk
)
≈s
(
Enc∗
(
pk, 1λ,Π(x1, . . . , x`), 1L, c1, . . . , c`)
)
, c1, . . . , c`, 1, pk, sk
)
where (pk, sk)← FHE.Gen(1λ) and ci ← FHE.Enc(pk, xi).
Intuitively, circuit privacy guarantees that ‘refreshed’ ciphertexts are distributed like some known
distribution which can be sampled from without the knowledge of Π. (This is formalised by
the property that the distribution of refreshed ciphertexts is negligibly close to the distribution
of ciphertexts which Enc∗ produces, where Enc∗ does not have access to information about Π. In
[BDPMW16], Enc∗ is known as Sim.) In other words, refreshed ciphertexts do not leak information
about the nature of the homomorphic computations that were performed on the ciphertext prior
to the refresh operation (excepting information about the length of Π).
Remark 2.4. We refer to ciphertexts which are sampled by Enc∗ as ‘fresh’ ciphertexts. This makes it conve-
nient to state that ciphertexts originating from FHE.Refresh are ‘indistinguishable from fresh ciphertexts’.
Levelled fully homomorphic encryption schemes with circuit privacy are known to exist, pred-
icated on the assumption that LWE is (quantum) computationally intractable [BDPMW16]. The
circuit-private FHE scheme exhibited in [BDPMW16] actually has FHE.Refresh = I, where I is the
identity circuit (meaning that circuit privacy is ‘built into’ evaluation). For clarity we explicitly
consider a ‘refreshing’ algorithm in our use of the primitive.
2.3.2 Commitment scheme
In the protocol described in section 3, we will twice make use of a commitment scheme consisting
of a tuple of PPT algorithms (gen, commit, reveal, verify) which operate as follows:
• gen(1`) takes as input a security parameter, and generates a public key pk and a secret key
sk. (We remark that sk is never used in the real commitment procedure; it exists purely for
simulation purposes.)
• commit(pk, b, s) takes as input a public key pk, a bit b ∈ {0, 1} to which to commit, and a
random string s, and produces a commitment string z.
• reveal(pk, z, b, s) outputs the inputs it is given.
• verify(pk, z, b, s) takes as argument a purported public key, commitment string, committed
bit and random string, and outputs either 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).
We require the following properties of this commitment scheme:
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• Perfectly binding: If commit(pk, b, s) = commit(pk, b′, s′), then b = b′.
• (Quantum) computationally concealing: For any public key pk ← gen(1`) and any two mes-
sages b, b′, the distributions over s of commit(pk, b, s) and commit(pk, b′, s) are quantum com-
putationally indistinguishable.
• Extractable: There is a PPT algorithm recover(pk, sk, z) which, for any z ← commit(pk, b, s),
outputs the unique b such that z = commit(pk, b, s).
Instantiation based on LWE. There are a number of folklore results on commitment schemes
based on the intractability of LWE. Below, we sketch a scheme (one sufficient for our purposes)
which is inspired by the LWE-based public-key encryption scheme presented by Regev in [Reg09].
Before we introduce our commitment scheme, we firstly provide an overview of the [Reg09]
public-key encryption scheme.
Definition 2.5 ([Reg09] public-key encryption scheme). Let m, n be security parameters, and let q =
poly(n) be a prime. The [Reg09] public-key encryption scheme is a tuple of algorithms (KeyGen,Enc,Dec)
of the following descriptions:
• KeyGen(1n, 1m, q) generates a uniformly random matrix A ∈ Zm×nq , along with a uniformly random
vector~s ∈ Znq and a ‘short’ noise vector e ∈ Znq . (We say that the vector e is ‘short’ because it has
bounded norm. We will not go into detail here about the distribution from which e is drawn. It suffices
to state that this distribution is well-defined and efficiently sampleable.) It outputs pk = (A, A~s+ e)
and sk =~s.
• Enc(pk, b) takes a message b ∈ {0, 1} and chooses a vector w ∈ {0, 1}m uniformly at random. It
outputs a ciphertext c = (c0, c1) = (wT A, wT(A~s + e) + b · b q2c).
• Dec(sk, c) is 0 if c1 − 〈c0,~s〉 is closer to 0 than to b q2cmod q, and 1 otherwise.
We refer the reader to [Reg09, Section 5] for the security analysis of the cryptosystem defined in
Definition 2.5.
We now provide a sketch of an LWE-based commitment scheme satisfying the properties specified
at the start of this section. In addition to the [Reg09] cryptosystem, we use the algorithms GenTrap
and Invert from [MP12, Theorem 2]. GenTrap is an algorithm which generates a matrix A with a
distribution negligibly close to the distribution of A in Definition 2.5, and in addition generates
a trapdoor R for A that allows the algorithm Invert to (given R) efficiently recover (~s, e) from any
A~s + e.
Definition 2.6 (Perfectly binding, computationally hiding, extractable commitment scheme based
on LWE). Let m, n be security parameters, and let q = poly(n) be a prime.
• gen(1n, 1m, q) outputs (A, R)← GenTrap(1n, 1m, q) as (pk, sk). The distribution of A is negligibly
close to uniform.
• commit(pk, b, s) uses s to generate
1. a uniformly random vector~s ∈ Znq ,
2. a short vector e sampled from the appropriate distribution, and
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3. a uniformly random string w ∈ {0, 1}m.
It then outputs z = (z0, z1, z2, z3) = (A, A~s + e, wT A, wT(A~s + e) + b · b q2c).
• reveal(pk, z, b, s) outputs the inputs it is given.
• verify(pk, z, b, s) checks that e(s) is sufficiently short, checks that z1 = z0~s+ e(s), and then decrypts
(z2, z3) using w(s) and~s(s). It outputs 1 if and only if the result is b.
In our setting, we are guaranteed that A is generated honestly (i.e. that it comes from running
GenTrap), because A is embedded into a CRS. Given that this is so, the commitment scheme we
have defined in Definition 2.6 is perfectly binding because, for an A originating from GenTrap
and a sufficiently short e, the vector A~s + e perfectly determines ~s. Then, if ~s is determined,
wT(A~s + e) + b · b q2c cannot decrypt to a value other than b, by correctness of the [Reg09] en-
cryption scheme. That the commitment scheme is computationally hiding follows directly from
the IND-CPA security of the [Reg09] scheme.
Finally, the commitment scheme is extractable because the trapdoor R allows an algorithm to
efficiently invert A (as described in [MP12, Theorem 12]). Specifically, recover(pk = A, sk = R, z)
runs Invert(R, A, A~s + e) to recover (~s, e), and then recovers b by decrypting wT(A~s + e) + b · b q2c.
Remark 2.7. It is possible to strengthen the commitment scheme in Definition 2.6 so that it satisfies the
following two properties:
1. The perfectly binding property holds for the randomness as well as for the committed bit. In other
words, if commit(pk, b, s) = commit(pk, b′, s′), then we can conclude not only that b = b′ but also
that (b, s) = (b′, s′).
2. The algorithm recover(pk, sk, z) recovers the randomness s as well as the committed bit b from a
commitment z.
In order to achieve these two properties, we simply have gen sample a second matrix A′ from GenTrap
during key generation, along with its trapdoor R′, and set pk = (A, A′), sk = (R, R′). Then we have
commit append the value z4 = A′w + e′ to the commitment z that it generates, for some appropriately
sampled short vector e′, where w is the uniformly random string in {0, 1}m that is used to compute z2 and
z3. We also modify verify appropriately, so that, in addition to the checks it performs in Definition 2.6, it
also checks that z4 = A′w + e′ and that (z2, z3) = (wT A, wT(A~s + e) + b · b q2c). The purpose of these
changes is to ensure that the value of w which is used to produce a given commitment z is also perfectly
determined by the value of z (which was not necessarily the case before, as A is in general not invertible).
Because A′ is sampled independently from A, the commitment scheme remains computationally hiding if
LWE is computationally intractable.
2.4 Argument systems
2.4.1 Interactive quantum machines
The definitions of interactive quantum machines, their executions and oracle access to an interactive
quantum machine are taken largely from [Unr12].
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Interactive quantum machines An interactive quantum machine is a machine M with two quan-
tum registers: a register S for its internal state, and a register N for sending and receiving messages
(the network register). Upon activation, M expects in N a message, and in S the state at the end
of the previous activation. At the end of the current activation, N contains the outgoing mes-
sage of M, and S contains the new internal state of M. A machine M gets as input: a security
parameter µ ∈ N, a classical input x ∈ {0, 1}∗, and quantum input |Φ〉, which is stored in S.
Formally, machine M is specified by a family of circuits {Mµx}µ∈N,x∈{0,1}∗ , and a family of inte-
gers {rµx}µ∈N,x∈{0,1}∗ . Mµx is the quantum circuit that M performs on the registers S and N upon
invocation. rµx determines the total number of messages/invocations. We might omit writing the
security parameter when it is clear from the context. We say that M is quantum-polynomial-time
(QPT for short) if the circuit Mµx has polynomial size in µ + |x|, the description of the circuit is
computable in deterministic polynomial time in µ + |x| given µ and x, and rµ,x is polynomially
bounded in µ and x.
Execution of interactive quantum machines For a pair of interactive quantum machines M and
M′ with internal registers S,S′ respectively and network register N, a security parameter µ, a pair
of quantum states |Φ〉 , |Φ′〉 and a pair of strings x, x′, we define the execution (M(x, |Φ〉), M′(x′, |Φ′〉))
via the following process: initialize registers S,S′,N as |Φ〉 , |Φ′〉 and |0〉; alternately apply Mµx to
registers S and N and Mµx′ to registers S′ and N; stop applying Mµx after rµx times and Mµx′ after
r′µx times, and then measure the S register in the computational basis. Let 〈M(x, |Φ〉), M′(x′, |Φ′〉)〉
be the random variable for the outcome of this measurement. For a k-tuple of interactive machines
M1, . . . , Mk, we assume that there is a message register Nij between any two machines. Machine
Mi has an internal register Si, an invocation register INVi, and is specified by a unitary Mi,µx, which
acts on Si, on all invocation registers INVj, and on all of Mi’s message registers (Nij for all j). Mi,µx
has the additional property that it always leaves all invocation registers in the state |0〉, except for
one in the state |1〉. This determines the next machine to be invoked.
Oracle access to an interactive quantum machine We say that a quantum algorithm A has oracle
access to an interactive quantum machine M (and we write this as AM, or sometimes A|M〉 to
emphasize that M is a quantum machine and that oracle access includes the ability to apply the
inverse of M) to mean the following. Besides the security parameter and its own classical input x,
we allow A to execute the quantum circuit Mµx specifying M, and its inverse (recall that these act
on the internal register S and on the network register N of M). Moreover, we allow A to provide
and read messages from M (formally, we allow A to act freely on the network register N). We do
not allow A to act on the internal register S of M, except via Mµx or its inverse.
2.4.2 Argument systems with setup
First we define the kinds of relations that underlie our argument systems. Classically, a relation
over finite sets X ×Y is a subset R ⊆ X ×Y . An NP relation R = {(x, w) : V|x|(x, w) = 1} has the
additional property that given any x ∈ X and w ∈ Y , the claim that (x, w) ∈ R can be verified by
a uniformly generated family of circuits V = {Vn} (the “verifier”).
In the quantum case the “input” x (the first argument to the relation) remains classical, but the
“witness” w (the second argument) can be a quantum state |ψ〉. Before we give our definition of a
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QMA relation we introduce some notation. Fix a uniformly generated family of polynomial-size
quantum circuits Q = {Qn}n∈N such that for every n, Qn takes as input a string x ∈ {0, 1}n and a
quantum state σ on p(n) qubits (for some polynomial p(n)) and returns a single bit as output. For
any 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 define
RQ,γ =
⋃
n∈N
{
(x, σ) ∈ {0, 1}n ×D(Cp(n)) ∣∣ Pr(Qn(x, σ) = 1) ≥ γ}
and
NQ,γ =
⋃
n∈N
{
x ∈ {0, 1}n ∣∣ ∀σ ∈ D(Cp(n)) , Pr(Qn(x, σ) = 1) < γ} .
Note the presence of the parameter γ, that quantifies the expected success probability for the
verifier; γ can be thought of as a measure of the “quality” of a witness |ψ〉 (or mixture theoreof, as
represented by the density matrix σ) that is sufficient for the witness to be acceptable with respect
to the relation R.
Definition 2.8 (QMA relation). A QMA relation is specified by triple (Q, α, β) where Q = {Qn}n∈N
is a uniformly generated family of quantum circuits such that for every n, Qn takes as input a string
x ∈ {0, 1}n and a quantum state |ψ〉 on p(n) qubits and returns a single bit, and α, β : N → [0, 1] are
such that α(n)− β(n) ≥ 1/p(n) for some polynomial p and all n ∈ N. The QMA relation associated
with (Q, α, β) is the pair of sets RQ,α and NQ,β.
For (Q, α, β) a QMA relation, we define the (promise) language L = (Lyes, Lno) specified by (Q, α, β)
as
Lyes =
⋃
n∈N
{
x ∈ {0, 1}n|∃σ ∈ D(Cp(n)) s.t. (x, σ) ∈ RQ,α
}
, (1)
and Lno = NQ,β.
Note that in contrast to an NP relation, we define a QMA relation using two sets: the first set,
RQ,α, is the set of (instance, witness) pairs that are deemed to form part of the relation. The second
set, NQ,β, is the set of instances that are deemed to be such that they are in relation to no witness.
Some instances may lie in neither (the projection of) RQ,α or NQ,β; this is analogous to the necessity
for a “promise” between the completeness and soundness parameters α and β in the definition of
the class QMA, that do not appear in the definition of NP. In particular, note that whenever
α− β > 1/ poly(n) the language L defined in (1) lies in QMA.
Definition 2.9. A protocol with setup is a triple of interactive machines (S, P, V) with the following
properties:
1. S = {Sµn}µ∈N depends on the security parameter µ and an instance size n, takes no input and
returns a classical output in the message registers NSP and NSV . When the output in both registers
is the same, we refer to it as “common reference string”.
2. Each of P and V has two phases: P = (P1, P2) and V = (V1, V2). P1 = {P1,µn} and V1 = {V1,µn}
are interactive machines that depend on the security parameter µ and an instance size parameter n,
take a classical message input in register NSP and NSV respectively and return a quantum message
as output in registers NP1P2 and NV1V2 respectively. P2 = {P2,µn} and V2 = {V2,µn} are interactive
machines that depend on the security parameter µ and an input size n. V2 takes as input the output
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of V1, in register NV1V2 , as well as an instance x such that |x| = n. P2 takes as input the output of
P1, in register NP1P2 , an instance x such that |x| = n, and a quantum state ρ. V2 returns a single bit
b ∈ {0, 1} as output, and P2 returns no output. If b = 1 then we say that V accepts, and otherwise
we say that it rejects.
We refer to the first phase of P and V as the preprocessing phase, and to the second phase as the
instance-dependent phase.
Definition 2.10. Let (Q, α, β) be a QMA relation and s, c : N → [0, 1]. An argument system (with
setup) for (Q, α, β), with completeness c and soundness s, is a protocol with setup (S, P, V) such that
S, P, V are quantum polynomial-time and, in addition, the following hold:
1. (Completeness) For all (x, ρ) ∈ RQ,α, for all integer µ, the execution (S, P(x, ρ), V(x)) returns 1
with probability at least c(µ).
2. (Soundness) For all x ∈ NQ,β, all integer µ and all polynomial-time P∗ the execution (S, P∗(x), V(x))
returns 1 with probability at most s(µ).
When the second phase of a protocol with setup (S, P, V) consists of a single message from P to
V we refer to it as a non-interactive protocol with setup. If it is a an argument system with setup,
we refer to it as a non-interactive argument system with setup. When the first phase involves some
communication between P and V, we specify that it is a non-interactive argument system with
setup and preprocessing. When S outputs a common reference string (as defined in 2.9), we refer to
it as an argument system with CRS setup (possibly with preprocessing).
Note that Definition 2.10 requires that the execution (S, P(x, ρ), V(x)) returns 1 with probability
at least c(µ). In the case of sequential or parallel repetition of a protocol, it may not be possible for
the prover to succeed with a single copy of the witness ρ as input. In this case we may considering
relaxing the definition as follows.
Definition 2.11 (Completeness of argument system with setup — alternative definition). There ex-
ists a polynomial q > 0, such that for all (x, ρ) ∈ RQ,α, for all integers µ, the execution (S, P(x, ρ⊗q(µ)), V(x))
returns 1 with probability at least c(µ).
We will clarify, whenever we refer to an argument system with setup, which definition we refer
to.
2.5 Zero-knowledge arguments
2.5.1 Zero-knowledge
The notion of Zero-Knowledge in the presence of quantum verifiers and quantum auxiliary infor-
mation was first formulated by Watrous [Wat09]. Here, we adapt Unruh’s version of this defini-
tion. We first give a definition for argument systems with setup for NP relations, and then we give
the generalization to QMA relations.
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Definition 2.12. An interactive argument system with setup (S, P, V) for an NP relation R is quan-
tum computational zero-knowledge if for every quantum polynomial-time verifier V∗ there is a quantum
polynomial-time simulator Sim such that, for any quantum polynomial-time distinguisher D and any poly-
nomial l > 0, there is a negligible ν such that for any (x, w) ∈ R with |x|, |w| ≤ l(µ), and for any
quantum state |Ψ〉, we have:
Pr
(
b = 1 : ZE← |Ψ〉 , (S, P(x, w), V∗(Z)), b← D(Z,E))
− Pr (b = 1 : ZE← |Ψ〉 , S(x,Z), b← D(Z,E)) ≤ ν(µ) .
Here ZE← |Ψ〉 denotes that the quantum registers Z,E are initialized jointly in state |Ψ〉. And (S, P(x, σ), V∗(Z))
denotes an execution where V∗ gets access to the quantum register Z. Note that after that execution V∗ may
have changed the state of Z. S(x,Z) also gets access to and may change Z.
The only difference in the definition for QMA relations is that the prover receives a state σ such
that (x, σ) ∈ RQ,α. We report the full definition for completeness.
Definition 2.13. An interactive argument system with setup (S, P, V) for a QMA relation (Q, α, β) is
quantum computational zero-knowledge if for every quantum polynomial-time verifier V∗ there is a quan-
tum polynomial-time simulator Sim such that, for any quantum polynomial-time distinguisher D and any
polynomial l > 0, there is a negligible ν such that for any (x, σ) ∈ RQ,α with |x| ≤ l(µ), and for any
quantum state |Ψ〉,
Pr
(
b = 1 : ZE← |Ψ〉 , (S, P(x, σ), V∗(Z)), b← D(Z,E))
− Pr (b = 1 : ZE← |Ψ〉 , S(x,Z), b← D(Z,E)) ≤ ν(µ) .
2.5.2 Non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments for QMA
In this section we formally define the notion of NIZK arguments for QMA. This is the main object
we aim to construct in this paper.
Definition 2.14. An NIZK argument system with CRS setup for a QMA relation (Q, α, β) is a non-
interactive protocol with CRS setup Π = (S, P, V) such that:
1. Π is quantum computational zero-knowledge, as in Definition 2.13.
2. An execution of Π involves a single message from P to V.
3. Completeness of Π is 1− negl.
If P and V exchange additional messages in the preprocessing phase (but not in the instance-dependent
phase), we refer to Π as an NIZK argument sytem with CRS setup and preprocessing.
Definition 2.15 (Argument system for a language in QMA). We say that a language L ∈ QMA has
an NIZK argument system with CRS setup (and preprocessing) if there exists a QMA relation (Q, 1−
negl(n), negl(n)) which specifies L and such that there exists a NIZK argument system with setup (and
preprocessing) (S, P, V) for (Q, 1− negl(n), negl(n)).
Using the amplification technique from [MW05] it follows that any QMA relation that specifies a
QMA language L can be amplified to a QMA relation of the form (Q, 1− negl(n), negl(n)), such
that moreover the reduction preserves the honest quantum witness for positive instances of L.
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2.5.3 Non-interactive zero-knowledge for NP
A building block in our construction of NIZK argument systems for QMA are non-interactive
argument systems for NP in the CRS model (or with CRS setup). Based on the work of [CLW19,
PS19] it is possible to construct such argument systems satisfying both adaptive soundness and
adaptive zero-knowledge assuming only the hardness of the LWE problem. Here, we require such
arguments that maintain the soundness and zero-knowledge properties in case the adversarial
party may be quantum. We give the definitions and sketch how quantum security follows almost
immediately by adapting the same arguments from [CLW19] and using quantum-security of the
LWE-based correlation intractable hash family from [PS19].
For an NP relation R we let L(R) = {x : ∃w, (x, w) ∈ R}.
Definition 2.16. An NIZK argument system for an NP relation R is a non-interactive protocol with setup
Π = (S, P, V) such that in addition:
1. S = {Sµn} is a classical polynomial-time family of circuits that depend on the security parameter µ
and an instance size parameter n and return a common reference string crs.
2. P = {Pµn} is a classical polynomial-time family of circuits that take as input crs, an instance x and
a witness w and return a proof pi.
3. V = {Vµn} is a classical polynomial-time family of circuits that take as input crs, an instance x and
a proof pi and return a decision b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 1 then we say that V accepts, and otherwise we
say that it rejects.
4. P and V do not require a setup phase (other than receiving the common reference string crs from S).
5. Π is quantum computational zero-knowledge, as in Definition 2.12.
The argument system should satisfy the completeness requirement: for every integer µ, n, for every (x, w) ∈
R such that |x| = n, Vµn(crs, x,pi) = 1 with probability 1 when crs← Sµn() and pi ← Pµn(crs, x, w).
We define adaptive soundness and adaptive ZK for the case of quantum adversaries.
Definition 2.17 (Adaptive soundness). A NIZK argument Π for R is adaptively sound if for every
quantum polynomial time P∗ = {P∗µn} there is a negligible function ν such that for all µ,
Pr
crs←Sµn(), (x,pi)←P∗µn(crs)
(
x /∈ L(R) ∧V(crs, x,pi) = 1) ≤ ν(µ) .
Definition 2.18 (Adaptive zero-knowledge). A NIZK argumentΠ for R is adaptive zero-knowledge
if for every quantum polynomial time V∗ = {V∗µn} there is a quantum polynomial time simulator Sim =
{Simµn} such that for all quantum states σ the following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable
(with respect to quantum polynomial time distinguishers):{
crs← Sµn() , (x, w, τ)← V∗µn(crs, σ) : (crs, Pµn(crs, x, w), τ)
}
and {
Simµn(σ)
}
.
Note that in the first ensemble, τ is a quantum state that may be correlated in an arbitrary way with the
classical (x, w).
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Lemma 2.19. For any NP relation R there is a NIZK argument system that is adaptively sound and
adaptively ZK against quantum adversaries, assuming the hardness of LWE and the existence of statistically
binding and quantum computationally concealing commitment schemes.
Proof. Fix µ and n and let Com be a statistically binding and quantum computationally concealing
commitment scheme that can be used to commit to n × n Boolean matrices. We write a key for
Com as pk.
Our starting point is the 3-message protocol for graph Hamiltonicity from [FLS99], as described
in [CLW19, Section 5.1], and the NIZK argument Π˜ for it given in [CLW19, Construction 5.2].
Argument system. We recall the protocol to establish notation, referring to [CLW19, Section 5.1]
for more details. In the 3-message protocol, the prover first sends a commitment a = Com.commit(pk, H, s)
to a graph H that is a uniformly random permutation pi(Cn), for Cn the adjacency matrix of a
canonically fixed cycle. The verifier sends a random challenge e ∈ {0, 1}. If e = 0, the prover
reveals H. If e = 1, the prover, given (x, w) ∈ R where x is a graph and w a Hamiltonian cycle,
selects a permutation σ such that σ−1(Cn) is the cycle w. The prover sends pi ◦ σ as well as de-
commitments to entries of H that correspond to non-edges of pi ◦ σ(G). (In the actual protocol, the
above steps are repeated t times in parallel. For simplicity, we describe the protocol for a single
run.)
Next we recall the non-interactive variant, protocol Π˜ in [CLW19, Construction 5.2]. Here crs =
(pk, k) where pk is a key for the commitment scheme and k is a key for a familyH of hash functions
satisfying certain properties (correlation intractability and programmability, see [CLW19]). The
prover then computes a as above, sets e = hk(a), and computes the third message z as above. The
prover returns pi = (a, e, z).
The only difference with [CLW19, Construction 5.2] is that we use a statistically binding commit-
ment scheme instead of their PKE, as this is needed for soundness. We instantiate H using the
correlation intractable family of hash functions from [PS19].
In [CLW19, Theorem 5.5] it is shown that Π˜ is a NIZK argument system for NP in the common
reference string model satisfying both adaptive soundness and adaptive zero-knowledge against
classical adversaries. We briefly sketch how their argument extends to the quantum case.
Adaptive soundness. First we consider adaptive soundness. Here the argument is essentially
identical; we follow the proof of [CLW19, Lemma 5.6]. Let (crs, x,pi = (a, e, z)) be such that
V(crs, x,pi) = 1. Then for every i ∈ {1, . . . , t} (recall that the basic 3-message protocol is repeated
t times before applying Fiat-Shamir), using that the commitment is unconditionally binding it
must be that ei = 0 if and only if ai is a commitment to a cycle. This means that any P∗ which
breaks the adaptive soundness condition from Definition 2.17, given only crs, returns (a, e) ∈ R,
where is the set of pairs where for all i, ai is a commitment to a cycle if and only if ei = 0, with
probability at least ν(µ). By an averaging argument, there exists a fixed crs for which the same
holds. This contradicts the correlation intractability ofH which by [PS19] reduces to the quantum
hardness of LWE.
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Adaptive zero-knowledge. Next we consider adaptive zero-knowledge. For this we construct
a simulator, mostly following the proof of [CCRR18, Proposition 7.6]. Let V∗ be quantum poly-
nomial time. First, Simµn(σ) generates a key pk for Com. Then, it selects uniformly random chal-
lenges {ei} and permutations {pii}. If ei = 0, it sets ai ← Com.commit(pk,pii(Cn), s). If ei = 1, it
sets ai ← Com.commit(pk, 0, s) (for some randomness s).
The simulator then samples a key k∗ such that hk∗(ai) = ei for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t} and creates crs =
(pk, k∗).6 Then, the simulator executes V∗(crs, σ) to obtain (x, w, τ). Finally, if ei = 0 the simulator
sets zi = pii(Cn). If ei = 1 it selects a uniformly random permutation σi and sets zi to be σi together
with decommitments to the entries of ai that correspond to non-edges of σi(G).
This simulator is “straight-line simulator” and does not involve rewinding V∗. Therefore, the com-
putational zero-knowledge property follows from the computationally hiding property of Com
and the programmability ofH (to argue that k∗ is indistinguishable from a random key).
2.6 Proofs and arguments of quantum knowledge
The content of this subsection, as it pertains to proofs of quantum knowledge, was written in collab-
oration with Broadbent and Grilo, and appears with slight differences in their concurrent work.
A Proof of Knowledge (PoK) is an interactive proof system for some relation R such that if the ver-
ifier accepts some input x with high enough probability, then she is “convinced” that the prover
“knows” some witness w such that (x, w) ∈ R. This notion is formalized by requiring the exis-
tence of an efficient extractor K that is able to return a witness for x when given oracle access to the
prover (including the ability to rewind its actions, in the classical case).
Definition 2.20 (Classical Proof of Knowledge). Let R ⊆ X × Y be a relation. A proof system (P, V)
for R is a Proof of Knowledge for R with knowledge error κ if there exists a polynomial p > 0 and a
polynomial-time machine K such that for any classical interactive machine P∗, any µ ∈N, any polynomial
l > 0, any instance x ∈ {0, 1}n for n = poly(µ) and any string y: if the execution (P∗(x, y), V(x))
returns 1 with probability ε > κ(µ), we have
Pr
((
x, KP
∗(x,y)(x)
)
∈ R
)
≥ p
(
ε− κ(µ), 1
µ
)
.
In this definition, y corresponds to the side information that P∗ has, possibly including some w
such that (x, w) ∈ R.
PoKs were originally defined only considering classical adversaries, and this notion was first stud-
ied in the quantum setting by Unruh [Unr12]. The first issue that arises in the quantum setting is to
formalize the type of query that the extractor K is able to make. In order to do so, we assume that
P∗ always performs a fixed unitary operation U when invoked. Notice that this can be assumed
without loss of generality since (i) we can always consider a purification of P∗, (ii) all measure-
ments can be performed coherently, and (iii) P∗ can keep track of the round of communication
6The possibility for selecting k∗ in a way that is indistinguishable from a random key comes from the programmability
ofH; see [CLW19].
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in some internal register and U can implicitly control on this value. Then, the quantum extractor
K has oracle access to P∗ in the sense that it may perform U and U† on the message register and
private register of P∗, but has no direct access to the latter. We denote the extractor K with such
oracle access to P∗ by K|P∗(x,ρ)〉, where ρ is some (quantum) side information held by P∗.
Definition 2.21 (Quantum Proof of (Classical) Knowledge). Let R ⊆ X × Y be a relation. A proof
system (P, V) for R is a Quantum Proof of Knowledge for R with knowledge error κ if there exists a
polynomial p > 0 and a quantum polynomial-time machine K such that for any quantum interactive
machine P∗, any µ ∈ N, any polynomial l > 0, any instance x ∈ {0, 1}n for n = poly(µ) and any state
ρ: if the execution (P∗(x, ρ), V(x)) returns 1 with probability ε > κ(µ), we have
Pr
((
x, K|P
∗(x,ρ)〉(x)
)
∈ R
)
≥ p
(
ε− κ(µ), 1
µ
)
.
Remark 2.22. In the fully classical case of 2.20, the extractor could repeat the procedure in sequence poly-
nomially many times in order to increase the probability of a successful extraction (which, in Definitions
2.20 and 2.21, is allowed to be inverse-polynomially small in the security parameter). This is not known
to be possible for a general quantum P∗, since the final measurement to extract the witness could possibly
disturb the internal state of P∗, making it impossible to simulate the side information that P∗ had originally
in the subsequent simulations.
We finally move on to the full quantum setting, where we want a Proof of Quantum Knowledge
(PoQK). Intuitively, at the end of the protocol, we would like the verifier to be ‘convinced’ that
the prover ‘has’ a quantum witness for the input x. The main difference from Quantum Proofs of
(classical) Knowledge is that in the case of QMA relations, as defined in section 2.4.2, the notion of
a witness is not as unambiguous as in the case of NP relations. We introduce a parameter q which
quantifies the probability that the witness returned by the extractor makes the verifying circuit
accept. We refer to this parameter as the “quality” of the PoQK. We also allow the extractor K to
return a special symbol “⊥” in a designated portion of the output register, and we require that
either the extractor returns “⊥” or it returns a witness of a certain quality. Formally, we assume
that the output of the extractor is measured according to {|⊥〉 〈⊥| , I − |⊥〉 〈⊥|}. We ask that the
outcome of this measurement be the latter with at least inverse-polynomial probability, and that,
conditioned on the latter outcome, the post-measurement state be a witness (of a certain quality).
Definition 2.23 (Proof of Quantum Knowledge). Let (Q, α, β) be a QMA relation. A proof system
(P, V) is a Proof of Quantum Knowledge for (Q, α, β) with knowledge error κ and quality q > β, if
there exists a polynomial p > 0 and a quantum polynomial-time machine K such that for any quantum
interactive machine P∗, any µ ∈N, any polynomial l > 0, any instance x ∈ {0, 1}n for n = poly(µ) and
any state ρ: if the execution (P∗(x, ρ), V(x)) returns 1 with probability ε > κ(µ), we have
Pr
(
K|P
∗(x,ρ)〉(x) 6= “⊥” and
(
x,
(I − |⊥〉 〈⊥|)K|P∗(x,ρ)〉(x)
Tr[(I − |⊥〉 〈⊥|)K|P∗(x,ρ)〉(x)]
)
∈ RQ,q(|x|,ε)
)
≥ p
(
ε− κ(µ), 1
µ
)
.
We also define arguments of quantum knowledge (with a setup). The main difference is that the
proof system is replaced by an argument system with setup. Moreover, the extractor is allowed to
create the setup as they wish (they can “impersonate” the setup procedure S).
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Definition 2.24 (Quantum Argument of (Classical) Knowledge). Let R ⊆ X × Y be a relation. An
argument system with setup Π = (S, P, V) for R is a Quantum Argument of Knowledge with setup for R
with knowledge error κ if there exists a polynomial p > 0 and a quantum polynomial-time machine K such
that for any quantum polynomial-time interactive machine P∗, any µ ∈ N, any polynomial l > 0, any
instance x ∈ {0, 1}n for n = poly(µ) and any state ρ: if the execution (S, P∗(x, ρ), V(x)) returns 1 with
probability ε > κ(µ), we have
Pr
((
x, K|P
∗(x,ρ)〉(x)
)
∈ R
)
≥ p
(
ε− κ(µ), 1
µ
)
.
Definition 2.25 (Argument of Quantum Knowledge). Let (Q, α, β) be a QMA relation. An argument
system with setup Π = (S, P, V) is an Argument of Quantum Knowledge with setup for (Q, α, β) with
knowledge error κ and quality q > β if there exists a polynomial p > 0 and a quantum polynomial-time
interactive machine K such that for any quantum polynomial-time interactive machine P∗, any µ ∈ N,
any polynomial l > 0, any instance x ∈ {0, 1}n for n = poly(µ) and any state ρ: if the execution
(S, P∗(x, ρ), V(x)) returns 1 with probability ε > κ(µ), we have
Pr
(
K|P
∗(x,ρ)〉(x) 6= “⊥” and
(
x,
(I − |⊥〉 〈⊥|)K|P∗(x,ρ)〉(x)
Tr[(I − |⊥〉 〈⊥|)K|P∗(x,ρ)〉(x)]
)
∈ RQ,q(|x|,ε)
)
≥ p
(
ε− κ(µ), 1
µ
)
.
As for the several possible specializations to the definition of Argument of Quantum Knowledge
with setup based on the properties of the underlying argument system (NIZK, CRS setup, prepro-
cessing etc.), we naturally apply the terminology introduced in sections 2.4.2, 2.5.1 and 2.5.2.
2.6.1 Reducing the knowledge error sequentially
One of the most natural properties of Proofs of Knowledge that one investigates in the classical
setting is reducing the knowledge error by sequential repetition. Classically, it is well-known
that the knowledge error drops exponentially fast in the number of sequential repetitions [BG92].
Just like in the classical case, sequential repetition of a proof of quantum knowledge reduces the
knowledge error exponentially fast. This is an immediate consequence of the proof of a lemma
from Unruh [Unr12] for the case of quantum Proofs of (classical) Knowledge.
Lemma 2.26. Let n = n(µ) be a polynomially bounded and efficiently computable function. Let (P, V)
be a Proof of Quantum Knowledge for a QMA relation (Q, α, β) with knowledge error κ. Let (P′, V ′) be
the proof system consisting of n sequential executions of (P, V) (where V ′ accepts iff all executions accept).
Then (P′, V ′) is a Proof of Quantum Knowledge for (Q, α, β) with knowledge error κn.
Proof. Unruh’s argument applies to interactive machines with quantum auxiliary input, which
is our setting, and does not make use at all of the fact that the extractor’s output is a classical
string (the argument proceeds entirely at the level of the success probability of the extractor for
the sequentially composed proof and for the atomic proof).
The only difference from [Unr12] in the Quantum Knowledge case is that if the original PoQK
had the additional property of existence of an efficient prover which is accepted with probabil-
ity close to 1 when given a witness as auxiliary input, the corresponding efficient prover for the
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n-sequentially repeated protocol requires n copies of a witness. Formally, this does not affect the
completeness property of the proof system since this is formulated with respect to computation-
ally unbounded provers, who can generate as many witnesses as they wish on their own.
An analogous lemma holds for arguments of quantum knowledge. However, since in this case
the prover is computationally bounded, the completeness parameter will, in general, drop below
soundness, unless we give the prover multiple copies of the witness, instead of a single one. In
this case we say that the argument has completeness with respect to the alternative definition,
Definition 2.11.
3 The protocol
3.1 Notation and predicates
For a circuit Qn, we denote by H(Qn) the local Clifford Hamiltonian obtained by performing the
circuit-to-Clifford-Hamiltonian reduction from [BJSW16, Section 2]. In the rest of this section, Qn
will always be taken from a family Q = {Qn}n∈N, where Q specifies a QMA relation (Q, α, β), and
we will let the r-th term of the Clifford Hamiltonian H(Qn) be C∗r |0k〉 〈0k|Cr. So,
H(Qn) =
m
∑
r=1
C∗r |0k〉 〈0k|Cr , (2)
where each Cr is a k-local Clifford unitary. (Following [BJSW16], we use the short-hand |0k〉 〈0k|
to denote a projector which is |0〉 〈0| on at most k qubits and identity everywhere else. As shown
in [BJSW16], we can take k = 5 without loss of generality.)
We denote by Hclock ⊗ Hinstance ⊗ Hwitness the Hilbert space that H(Qn) acts on. For notational
convenience, we assume in the rest of this section thatHinstance is n qubits, that is,Hinstance = C2n .
For clarity and notational convenience, we define predicates Rr and Q below (along the lines of
Definitions 2.1 and 2.2) which we will refer to in our description of our protocol.
Remark 3.1. Predicates Q and Rr are defined with respect to a fixed problem instance x and a fixed Clifford
Hamiltonian H, where
H =
m
∑
r=1
C∗r |0k〉 〈0k|Cr
for some m that is polynomial in n.
Definition 3.2 (Definition of Rr). As in section 2.2, we writeDN to represent the set of all valid (classical)
N-bit codewords of a particular error-correcting code. We will generally refer to this error-correcting code
as ‘the concatenated Steane code’. (This code is the same concatenated Steane code which is outlined in
[BJSW16, Appendix A.6].) We may write DN = D0N ∪ D1N , where D0N is the set of all codewords that
encode 0, and D1N is defined analogously.
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We assume that r takes values in [m + 1], where m is the number of terms in the Clifford Hamiltonian H.
Our Rr is defined differently when r ∈ [m] and when r = m + 1.
If r ∈ [m]: we define Rr(t,pi, u) = R˜r(t,pi, u), where R˜r is the predicate defined in Definition 2.1.
If r = m + 1, then we set Rr = Rm+1, where Rm+1 is defined below (Definition 3.3).
Definition 3.3 (Definition of Rm+1). Let u = uclock1 , uinstance1 , . . . , uinstance` be a string in {0, 1}2N(`+1).
Remark 3.4. Each ulabel, for label ∈ {clock1, instance1, . . . , instance`}, is a 2N-bit string, and intuitively
represents the result of measuring the logical qubit with an index specified by label. (For notational con-
venience in the exposition below, we replace the iterator label by the iterator i.) For example, uclock1 is the
string that results from measuring the first logical qubit of the clock register. The logical clock register con-
sists of many logical qubits, and each logical qubit is encoded in 2N physical qubits as a result of applying
the authentication code described in Figure 1.
For pi ∈ S2N , and for each i ∈ {clock1, instance1, . . . , instance`}, define strings pi, qi in {0, 1}N such that
pi(pi‖qi) = ui (alternatively: pi−1(ui) = pi‖qi). The predicate Rm+1(t,pi, u) takes the value 1 if and only
if the following two conditions (1. and 2.) are met:
1. Either
pclock1 ∈ D1N (this corresponds to the first qubit of the clock register, expressed in unary,
being in state 1, i.e. the clock register is not at time 0),
or
For every i ∈ {instance1, . . . , instance`}, pi ∈ DxiN .
2. 〈qclock1 qinstance1 · · · qinstance` |tclock1 tinstance1 · · · tinstance`〉 6= 0.
We now define our predicate Q in terms of the Rr defined in Definition 3.2.
Definition 3.5 (Definition of Q). Let d = (a′, b′) = (a′1, . . . , a
′
2N(`+1), b
′
1, . . . , b
′
2N(`+1)) be a string in
{0, 1}4N(`+1). Define
Pm+1 = |0〉 〈0|clock1 ⊗
(
I − |x〉 〈x| )
instance
⊗ Iwitness
+(I − |0〉 〈0|)clock1 ⊗ Iinstance ⊗ Iwitness
where |x〉 〈x| is a shorthand for the projector onto the standard-basis bitstring 〈x〉, and
Cm+1 = Iclock ⊗ Iinstance ⊗ Iwitness.
For r ∈ [m + 1], define
Pr =
{
C∗r |0k〉 〈0k|Cr r ∈ [m]
Pm+1 r = m + 1
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Let i1, .., ik be the indices of the qubits on which Pr acts non-trivially, and let ei1 , . . . , eik be the unique
strings such that
C⊗2Nr (X
(a⊕a′)i1 Z(b⊕b
′)i1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ X(a⊕a′)ik Z(b⊕b′)ik ) = α(Xei1 Z fi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xeik Z fik )C⊗2Nr (3)
for some α ∈ {1, i,−1,−i} and some fi1 , . . . , fik ∈ {0, 1}2N . (It is possible to efficiently compute e =
ei1 , . . . , eik and f = fi1 , . . . , fik given a, b and Cr.)
Predicate Q is defined as follows:
Q(t,pi, a, b, r, z, d) = Rr(t,pi, z⊕ ei1 · · · eik).
3.2 The protocol
Parties. The argument system involves
1. A (QPT) verifier V,
2. A (QPT) prover P, and
3. A (classical PPT) setup machine S.
The verifier sends a single quantum message to the prover in the preprocessing phase of the pro-
tocol, and the prover sends the verifier a single classical message in the instance-dependent phase
of the protocol. S sends an identical classical message to both the prover and the verifier during
the preprocessing phase.
Inputs. (Unless otherwise stated, all inputs are common to all three parties.)
1. Preprocessing stage:
(a) An instance size parameter n and a security parameter µ.
(b) A QMA relation (Q, α, β).
(c) The Clifford Hamiltonian H(Qn) (see equation (2)).
(d) Other parameters:
i. c(n), an upper bound on the number of qubits in a witness state;
ii. p(n), an upper bound on the number of qubits in a history state corresponding to
an execution of Qn on a witness state of length c(n) and an instance of size n;
iii. m = poly(n), the number of terms in the Clifford Hamiltonian (equation (2));
iv. N = poly(n), the number of physical qubits per logical qubit in the Steane code
introduced in section 2.2.
(e) A perfectly binding, quantum computationally concealing (classical) commitment scheme
Com = (Com.gen,Com.commit,Com.reveal,Com.verify,Com.recover), of the form described
in section 2.3.2.
(f) A NIZK argument system with setup for NP, such as the one described in section 2.5.3.
We denote this argument system by a triple (NIZK.S,NIZK.P,NIZK.V).
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(g) A levelled fully homomorphic encryption scheme with circuit privacy,
FHE = (FHE.Gen,FHE.Enc,FHE.Dec,FHE.Eval,FHE.Refresh).
2. Instance-dependent stage:
(a) The instance x.
(b) Auxiliary (private) input to the prover: a witness ρ for the claim that x ∈ RQ,α.
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Protocol.
Refer to Figure 6 for a diagram charting the essential structure of the protocol below.
Preprocessing step:
(S) S samples γP,γV ← NIZK.S(1q(n), 1µ), for a sufficiently large polynomial q > 0, in addition
to (pkP, skP), (pkV , skV)← Com.gen(1µ) (the two pairs are sampled independently). S then
outputs (γ, pkP, pkV).
(i) V samples r′ $←− [m + n]. Sets r = r′ if r ≤ m, and r = m + 1 otherwise. Computes
σ← Com.commit(pkV ; r). Let sV be the randomness used.
(ii) V creates 2Np(n) EPR pairs (2N for each qubit of the history state). The second qubit of
each EPR pair will be sent to P in step (iv). We refer to the remaining qubits (i.e. the first
qubit in each EPR pair) as “V’s qubits”.
(iii) V interprets her 2Np(n) qubits as the encoding (according to the authentication code of Fig.
1) of a history state for H(Qn).
• If r ∈ [m]: V applies Cr transversally to the subset of her 2Np(n) qubits which encode
the k logical qubits on which Cr acts. Measures those qubits in the computational
basis, obtaining an outcome string z.
• If r = m + 1: V measures the subset of the 2Np(n) qubits corresponding to the first
qubit ofHclock and all the qubits ofHinstance in the computational basis, obtaining an
outcome string z.
(iv) V samples (pkE, skE)← FHE.Gen(1n). V sends to P:
• α← FHE.Enc(pkE, (r, sV , z)).
• pkE and σ.
• An NIZK argument that there exists e = (r′, s′, z′) and t such that
FHE.Enc(pkE, e; t) = α (t are the random coins used by FHE.Enc). V uses γV in order to
compute this argument.
Figure 2: The preprocessing step of our NIZK argument for QMA
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Instance-dependent step:
• Prover’s message:
1. P executes NIZK.V to check the validity of the NIZK argument received in step (iv) of
the preprocessing step. If it is valid, P proceeds to the next step. Otherwise P aborts.
2. P computes the history state corresponding to an evaluation of the circuit Qn on the
input |x〉 ⊗ |ψ〉. This is the state |Ψ〉 = ∑Tt=0 |t〉clock ⊗Πtj=1Uj
( |x〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉⊗n ) for
some unitary Uj, which can be computed efficiently. P computes |Ψ˜〉 ← Auth.Enc(|Ψ〉)
according to the authentication scheme of Fig. 1. Let the sampled authentication keys
be:
(a) a = a1, .., ap(n), b = b1, .., bp(n) for a1, .., ap(n), b1, .., bp(n) ∈ {0, 1}2N ,
(b) pi ∈ S2N ,
(c) t = t1, .., tp(n) where t1, .., tp(n) ∈ {0,+,+y}N .
P samples commitment randomness sP, and computes
σkeys ← Com.commit(pk, (t,pi, a, b), sP).
3. P teleports the state ρ to V using his halves of the 2Np(n) shared EPR pairs received in
step (iv) of the preprocessing step. Let
d = (x1, . . . , x2Np(n), y1, . . . , y2Np(n)) ∈ {0, 1}4Np(n) be the Bell basis measurement
outcomes obtained during the teleportation.
4. P computes β← FHE.Enc(pkE, (d, σ, σkeys, (t,pi, a, b), sP)), where σ is the commitment
received in step (iv) of the preprocessing step. P homomorphically evaluates the
following circuit C using β and the ciphertext α that it received from the verifier.
(Recall that α is an encryption of (r, sV , z).)
C takes as input d, σ, r, sV , z, σkeys, t,pi, a, b, sP. It checks that (r, sV) is a valid
opening for σ, and that Q(t,pi, a, b, r, z, d) = 1, where Q is defined in
Definition 3.5. If its checks pass, using γP it computes an NIZK argument for
the existence of an opening to σkeys such that the opened value (t,pi, a, b)
satisfies Q(t,pi, a, b, r, z, d) = 1. If its checks do not pass, it outputs “⊥”.
5. Let p˜i be the encrypted proof that P obtains in step 4. P computes
p˜i′ ← FHE.Refresh(p˜i). Sends d, σkeys and p˜i′ to V.
• Verifier’s check: V decrypts p˜i′, and executes NIZK.V to check the decrypted proof. It
checks that the d received from P is the same d that appears in the statement being proven.
Figure 3: The instance-dependent step of our NIZK argument for QMA
Theorem 3.6. Every language in QMA has a NIZK argument argument system with CRS setup and
preprocessing, with completeness 1− negl and soundness negl. Moreover, the preprocessing phase consists
of a single quantum message from the verifier to the prover.
We refer to the combination of the protocols of Figures 2 and 3 as “the protocol”.
To show Theorem 3.6 we start with an arbitrary language L ∈ QMA. Using standard amplification
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techniques, for any polynomial t there is a family of polynomial-size verification circuits Q such
that L is the language associated with the QMA relation (Q, 1, 2−t) as in Definition 2.8. We show
that the protocol associated to this relation is an NIZK argument with setup for (Q, 1− 2−t, 2−t).
Completeness is easy to verify, as for any (x, ρ) ∈ RQ,1−2−t the prover described in Figure 3 is
accepted with probability negligibly close to 1, given access to ρ. In Section 4 we prove soundness
inverse polynomially close to 1, and in Section 4.4 we show how soundness can be amplified in
parallel to any 2−p for polynomial p (provided t is taken large enough compared to p). Finally, in
Section 5 we prove the zero-knowledge property.
4 Soundness
4.1 Overview
The structure of the proof is as follows. We show through a sequence of hybrids that it is possible
to transform an execution of our protocol on some instance x, into an execution of the protocol
from [BJSW16] on a specific local Clifford Hamiltonian derived from x. We show that such trans-
formation can at most negligibly decrease the optimal acceptance probability of the prover. Thus,
soundness of our protocol reduces to soundness of the protocol from [BJSW16]. The main steps in
our sequence of hybrids are the following:
• Remove the zero knowledge proof that V sends to the prover in step (iv) of the preprocessing
step;
• Remove the encryption of V’s choice of r, randomness sV and measurement outcomes z sent
in step (iv) of the preprocessing step.
• Replace the step where P teleports the encoded witness to V through shared EPR pairs (step
3 in Fig. 3) with one where P directly sends the qubits of the encoded witness to V.
• Remove the CRS, and replace the NIZK argument sent by the prover in step 5 of Fig. 3 with
a ZK proof.
In more detail, fix a QMA relation (Q, α, β) and an instance x of size n. Consider the following
sequence of hybrid experiments. Each experiment describes a modified verifier, and thus a modi-
fied protocol. We will argue that the optimal probability of a prover being accepted in any of the
protocols can only increase (or at most negligibly decrease) across hybrids.
H0: This is the real experiment in which V behaves as described in Figure 2 and Figure 3.
H1: Same as H0, except V1 does not send the NIZK proof from step (iv) of the preprocessing step.
H2: Same as H1, except V2 does not send to P an encryption of r, sV and her outcomes z. Instead,
she sends an encryption of the zero string. The instance-dependent step is now interactive, and
proceeds as follows:
(a) V2 expects d and σ from P.
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(b) Let z be the outcome of V2’s measurements from step (iii) of the preprocessing step. V2 Sends
z, r and sV to P (in the clear).
(c) V2 expects an NIZK argument (in the clear) of existence of an opening of σ such that the
opened keys t,pi, a, b satisfy Q(t,pi, a, b, r, z, d) = 1.
H3: Same as H2 except V3 does not send the encryption of the zero string.
H4: Same as H3, except V4’s measurements in step (iii) of the preprocessing step are postponed. V4
proceeds directly to the instance-dependent step as in H3. Only after receiving d, σ, V4 measures
according to step (iii), and sends the outcome z of these measurements to P. The rest is the same.
H5: We modify H4 as follows: V5 does not send any EPR pairs to P. In step 1 of the instance-
dependent step, V5 expects P to send a 2Np(n)-qubit state directly, together with a string d and a
commitment σ. V5 obtains z by measuring the received state. The rest is the same.
H6: Same as H6, except V6 does not expect any string d. The relation for which V6 expects an NIZK
argument is modified so that d (which was previously part of the instance) is now fixed to 0 (or
equivalently Q˜ is replaced with Q, from Definition 2.2).
H7 : Same as H6, except V7 does the following: in part (i) of the preprocessing step, V7 samples
r′ $←−∈ [m + n]. V7 computes σ← Com.commit(pkV ; r′). In part (iii) of Fig. 2,
• If r ∈ {1, . . . , m}: same as before.
• If r = m + i, i ∈ [n]: V7 measures the subset of the 2Np(n) qubits corresponding to the first
qubit of Hclock and to the i-th qubit of Hcircuit-desc in the computational basis, obtaining an
outcome string z.
In the final step, V7 expects from P an NIZK argument for the existence of an opening to the com-
mitted keys such that the opened keys t,pi, a, b satisfy Q′(t,pi, a, b, r, z) = 1, where Q′ is defined as
follows from R′r.
Definition 4.1 (Definition of R′r, r ∈ {m+ 1, . . . , m+ n}). Let uclock1 , uinstance1 , .., uinstancen ∈ {0, 1}2N
(these represent the measurement results that the verifier sends to the prover in step (iii) of Fig 2 when
r = m + 1). For pi ∈ S2N , for each i ∈ {clock1, instance1, . . . , instancen}, define strings pi, qi in {0, 1}N
such that pi(pi‖qi) = ui (alternatively: pi−1(ui) = pi‖qi). Let u = uclock1 , uinstance1 , .., uinstancen . The
predicate R′m+i(t,pi, u) takes the value 1 if and only if the following two conditions are met:
1. pclock1 ∈ D1N (this corresponds to the first qubit of the clock register, expressed in unary, being in
state 1, i.e. the clock register is not at time 0), or pi ∈ DxiN .
2. 〈qclock1 qinstance1 · · · qinstancen |tclock1 tinstance1 · · · tinstancen〉 6= 0
Definition 4.2 (Definition of Q’). • If r ∈ {1, . . . , m},
Q′(t,pi, a, b, r, u) = R′r(t,pi, u⊕ ei1 · · · eik),
where i1, .., ik are the indices of the qubits on which the Cr acts non-trivially and ei1 , . . . , eik are the
37
unique strings such that
C⊗2Nr (X
ai1 Zbi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xaik Zbik ) = α(Xei1 Z fi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xeik Z fik )C⊗2Nr
for some α ∈ {1, i,−1,−i} and some fi1 , . . . , fik ∈ {0, 1}2N .
• If r = m + i, for i ∈ [n]:
Q′(t,pi, a, b, r, u) = R′r(t,pi, u⊕ aclock1 ainstance1 · · · ainstancen).
H8: Same as H7, except V8 does not send a commitment to the randomness r. We also drop
the associated public key pkV from the CRS. The first message in the protocol is from P who is
expected to send a state and a commitment. After that, V8 sends z, r to P. The rest is the same.
H9: Same as H8, except we remove γP from the CRS, and the NIZK proof from P to V9 in the last
round is replaced by a (interactive) ZK proof.
H10: Same as H9, except that after the first message of the prover, V10 and P engage in a coin flip-
ping protocol. This determines the randomness r. In the next round V10 sends her measurement
outcome z to P, and the rest is the same.
H11: Same as H10, except we remove pkP from the CRS, and we replace the public-key commitment
scheme Com with the commitment scheme commit used by the prover in the [BJSW16] protocol.
In Section 4.2 we show that, up to negligible quantity, the maximum success probability of a prover
in the protocol described in H11 can only be higher than the maximum success probability of a
prover in the protocol described in H0. In Section 4.3 we show that this implies soundness of the
protocol. Finally, in Section 4.4 we show that soundness can be amplified in parallel.
4.2 Success probability in hybrids
Lemma 4.3. The optimal probability of a prover being accepted in H0 is at most negligibly higher than in
H11.
Proof. We argue that the optimal probability of the prover can decrease at most negligibly across
hybrids.
H0 ≈ H1. We show that given any prover P for H0, we can find a prover P′ for H1 which is
accepted with negligibly close probability. Since the converse is clear, the maximum success prob-
ability of a prover in H0 and H1 is negligibly close.
H0 and H1 only differ in step (iv) of the preprocessing protocol, where, in the latter, V does not
provide any NIZK proof. The prover P′ acts as follows: P′ forwards to P the message it receives
from V in step (iv). P′ then runs the simulator Sim for the NIZK proof of step (iv) (which is
guaranteed to exist by the ZK property of the proof; this step does not need adaptive ZK since
the verifier is honest and the statement to be proven is sampled independently of the CRS) on the
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(quantum) registers of P. Then, P′ continues the rest of the protocol by running P and V. Suppose
for a contradiction that the probabilities of P and P′ being accepted differ more than negligibly.
Then there must exist a polynomial q such that, for infinitely many n, there exist a ciphertext α(n)
and a joint state ρ(n) of V and P (before the point where H1 and H2 differ), such that∣∣∣Pr (V accepts P in H0∣∣α(n), ρ(n))− Pr (V accepts P′ in H1|α(n), ρ(n)) ∣∣∣ > 1q(n) . (4)
Suppose that it is the first probability that is inverse-polynomially higher infinitely often (the other
case is analogous). We construct a distinguisherD that breaks the zero-knowledge property of the
argument.
Let D be the following (non-uniform) distinguisher: D takes as input a string x (the instance) and
a quantum register, which it interprets as being a register of V and a register of P. It runs V and
P using these registers: D outputs 0 (i.e. guesses that it received a sample from a true transcript)
if V accepts, and outputs 1 (i.e. guesses that it received a sample from the simulator) if V rejects
(note that D is running V so it has the secret key that V uses to decrypt the ciphertext received by
the prover in the very last step).
It is straightforward to see that on the sequence of instance, auxliary input pairs α(n), ρ(n), D suc-
ceeds at distinguishing the (quantum) transcript of a true NIZK proof from that of Sim with prob-
ability at least 1q(n) . In the former case, the output of D is distributed exactly as an experiment H0
between V and P conditioned on α(n) being the ciphertext sent by V in step (iv), and ρ(n) being
the joint state of V and P right before the ZK proof. In the latter case, it is distributed exactly as an
experiment H1 between V and P′ conditioned on α being the ciphertext sent by V and ρ(n) being
the joint state of V and (the invoked) P right before P′ runs Sim to simulate a transcript of the ZK
proof.
H1 ≈ H2. We start with the following claim.
Claim 4.4. For any prover P∗ that plays H1 or H2 up to step (a) of H2, the probability that P∗ outputs a
pair (d, σ) such that, letting t,pi, a, b be the value committed in σ and z, r be V’s message in step (b), we
have Q˜(t,pi, a, b, r, z, d) = 1 is negligibly close for H1 and H2.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that there is a P∗ such that the probability that P∗ outputs a
good d in H1 and in H2 differ non-negligibly. Then, there exists a polynomial q > 0 such that the
difference between the probabilities is at least 1/q(µ) for infinitely many values of the security
parameter µ. Suppose it is the first probability that is at least at least 1/q(µ) larger infinitely often.
(the reverse case is similar).
We construct an adversary A that breaks CPA security of FHE. A proceeds as follows:
• A receives a public key pkE for the FHE scheme from the challenger.
• A runs γP,γV ← NIZK-CRS.Setup and ( p˜kP, s˜kP), ( p˜kV , s˜kV) ← Com.gen(1µ). A then runs
the honest verifier V and P∗ on common input the CRS (γV ,γP, p˜kP, p˜kV), except that if
forwards pkE to V in step (iv) (it does not matter thatA cannot give the secret key to V, since
V only uses this in the very final “Verifier’s check” of Fig. 3, which A will not need to run).
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Let z be the outcomes of V’s measurements in step (iii). Let r and sV be respectively V’s
committed random choice of Hamiltonian term and the randomness used for committing to
it. A sets m0 = r, sV , z, and m1 = 0. Sends m0 and m1 to the challenger.
• The challenger returns a ciphertext c. A forwards this to P∗ as the first part of the verifier’s
message in step (iv), and runs P∗ obtaining output d, σ where σ is some commitment.
• A decrypts σ using s˜kP, obtaining (t,pi, a, b). If the output is not of this form or (t,pi, a, b) is
not consistent with d, r, z, then A guesses that the ciphertext received was an encryption of
m1; otherwise of m0.
Denote by b the bit sampled by the challenger. Notice that in the case that b = 0, the distribution
of the output d that A obtains from P∗ is precisely that of H1. When b = 1, it is precisely that of
H2. Given the hypothesis, this implies that A wins the CPA-security game with 1/q advantage
infinitely often, which contradicts CPA-security of FHE.
Next, we show that the optimal probabilities of a prover being accepted in H1 and in H2 are
negligibly close. Let P be a prover for H1. We construct a prover P′ for H2 such that
Pr
(
P′ is accepted
)
> Pr
(
P is accepted
)− negl(|x|) .
P′ runs as follows:
• As part of H2, P′ receives a CRS (γV ,γP, pkP, pkV). It then receives a commitment σ˜ and
a ciphertext c. P′ runs ( p˜kP, s˜kP) ← Com.gen(1µ). It provides (γ, p˜kP, pkV) to P as CRS,
and c as the ciphertext. P returns d and σ. P′ decrypts σ using s˜kP. Let t,pi, a, b be the
committed value (if the committed value is not of this form or if decryption fails, P′ aborts).
P′ computes σ′ ← Com.commit(pkP; t,pi, a, b). Let s′ be the randomness used. P′ returns d, σ′
to the verifier of H2.
• P′ receives z, r, sV . If z, r, d, t,pi, a, b are consistent, P′ computes an NIZK proof of the exis-
tence of an opening to σ′ such that the opened keys are consistent with z, r, d.
Since the NIZK argument system employed has negligible soundness (we chose the NIZK argu-
ment system from Section 2.5.3), the probability that P is accepted in H1 conditioned on returning
a bad (d, σ) is negligible. By Claim 4.4, it follows that
Pr
(
P′′ is accepted
)
> Pr
(
P′ returns a good (d, σ)
)− negl(|x|)
> Pr
(
P′ is accepted
)− negl(|x|)
where the first inequality follows from Claim 4.4, and the second is because the NIZK argument
system employed has negligible soundness, and so the probability that P′ is accepted in H1 con-
ditioned on returning a bad (d, σ) is negligible.
We have thus shown that the optimal probability of acceptance in H2 is at least that of H1, up to a
negligible quantity. An analogous argument shows the converse. Hence, the optimal probabilities
of acceptance in H1 and H2 are negligibly close.
H2 ≈ H3. The encryption of the zero string can be simulated by the prover itself, so clearly the
optimal acceptance probabilities in H2 and H3 are exactly equal.
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H3 ≈ H4. For any prover P∗, since the action of P∗ to produce d, σ and the measurements of V
from step (iii) of the preprocessing step commute, performing them before receiving d, σ or after
does not change the acceptance probability of P∗.
H4 ≈ H5 We show that the optimal probability of a prover being accepted in H4 and H5 is the
same. Given a prover P for H4 one can construct a prover P′ that is accepted in H5 with the same
probability: P′ starts by sharing 2Np(n) EPR pairs with P. When P outputs (d, σ), P′ forwards
(d, σ) as well as his half of the 2Np(n) EPR pairs to V. When V returns a message of the form
(z, r, sV), P′ forwards this to P. P’ returns the final message of P to V. It is clear that the acceptance
probability of P′ is the same as that of P, as the distribution of the whole transcript is identical to
that of experiment H4. The reverse direction is similar.
H5 ≈ H6. Again, the optimal probabilities in H5 and H6 are the same. For any prover P for H5,
we construct P′ for H6 which is accepted with the same probability. P′ runs P. The only difference
is that when P outputs d = (a, b) and a state ρ to send to V, P′ sends XaZbρ(XaZb)† to V.
H6 ≈ H7. We show that the optimal acceptance probability can only increase. Let P be a prover in
H6. We construct a prover P′ for H7 as follows. P′ samples a CRS (γ, pkP, pkV) such that it knows
the secret key skP corresponding to pkP. Upon receiving a commmitment (to some randomness)
from the verifier, it runs P obtaining σ, ρ˜. It decrypts σ using skP. Let (t,pi, a, b) be the opened
value (if it is not of this form, P′ aborts). P′ sends σ, ρ˜ to the verifier. Upon receiving z, r from the
verifier, P′ does the following:
• If r ∈ {1, . . . , m}: P’ obtains an NIZK proof from P and forwards this to the verifier.
• If r = m+ i, i ∈ [l(n)]: P′ computes an NIZK proof for the existence of an opening to σ such
that the opened keys (t,pi, a, b) satisfy Q′(t,pi, a, b, r, z) = 1 (where Q′ is as defined in 4.2).
Notice that in H7, the verifier only measures the subset of physical qubits corresponding to the
i-th qubit of the circuit description, and the check that it performs is strictly less stringent than in
H6. A simple calculation shows that the probability of acceptance of P′ in H7 is at least that of P in
H6.
H7 ≈ H8. We first show that the acceptance probability of a prover P cannot change more than
negligibly if the commitment to r in H7 is replaced by a commitment to a zero string. Suppose for a
contradiction that there exists P such that the probability of acceptance in H7 differs non-negligibly
from H8. This implies that there exists a polynomial q > 0 such that the two probabilities differ by
at least 1/q(µ) for infinitely many values of the security parameter µ. Suppose the first probability
is higher by at least 1/q infinitely often (the reverse case is similar). Then, we can construct an
adversary A that breaks the hiding property of the commitment. A samples a random r and
sends m0 = r and m1 = 0 to the challenger. Upon receiving a commitment and a public key
pkP from the challenger, A simulates a CRS which includes pkP and an execution of the verifier
from V7 (or equivalently V8) except that it forwards to P the commitment received. If the verifier
accepts, A guesses that it received a commitment to r, otherwise that it received a commitment to
0. Notice that when the challenger sends a commitment to r the view of P is exactly as in H7, and
when it sends a commitment to 0 the view of P is exactly as in H8. Thus A has 1/q distinguishing
advantage infinitely often, which gives the desired contradiction.
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H8 ≈ H9. We show that the optimal acceptance probability decreases at most negligibly. Let P
be a prover for H8. We construct a prover P′ for H9 as follows. P′ gets as input the CRS pkP. Then,
P′ samples a CRS p˜kP such that it knows the secret key s˜kP corresponding to p˜kP. It forwards
p˜k to P as the CRS, and obtains σ, ρ˜. It decrypts σ using s˜kP. Let (t,pi, a, b) be the opened value
(if it is not of this form P′ aborts). P′ computes σ′ ← Com.commit(pkP; t,pi, a, b). Let s′ be the
randomness used. Sends ρ˜, σ′ to the verifier. P′ receives z, r from the verifier, and checks that
Q(z, r, t,pi, a, b) = 1. If so, it engages with the verifier in a ZK proof of existence of an opening to
σ′ such that the opened keys, together with z, r, satisfy the predicate Q. Since the NIZK proof has
negligible adaptive soundness, the probability that P is accepted in H9 conditioned on z, r, t,pi, a, b
being inconsistent is negligible. This implies that
Pr
(
P′ is accepted in H9
)
> Pr
(
P is accepted in H8
)− negl(|x|) .
H9 ≈ H10. From a prover P for H9, we obtain a prover P′ for H10 with the same acceptance
probability as follows: P′ runs P for the first round. Then P′ engages in an honest coin flipping
protocol with the verifier and forwards the outcome r to P. Finally, P′ runs P until the end.
H10 ≈ H11. We show that the optimal acceptance probability can only increase. Let P be a prover
for H10. We construct a prover P′ for H11 as follows. Similar to the earlier argument for H8 ≈ H9,
P′ samples a CRS p˜kP such that it knows the corresponding secret key s˜kP. It forwards p˜kP as CRS
to P who returns ρ˜, σ. P′ decrypts σ using s˜kP. Let (t,pi, a, b) be the opened value. P′ computes
σ′ ← commit(t,pi, a, b). Let s′ be the randomness used. P′ Sends σ, ρ˜ to the verifier. P′ engages
honestly in a coin-flipping protocol with V. Let r be the outcome. Upon receiving z from the
verifier, P′ checks that Q(z, r, t,pi, a, b) = 1. If so, it engages in a ZK proof of an opening to σ′
such that the opened keys, together with z, r satisfy the predicate Q. Since the ZK proof has
negligible soundness, the probability that P is accepted in H10 conditioned on Q(z, r, t,pi, a, b) = 0
is negligible. Moreover, since the interaction of P with V in the coin-flipping protocol could have
been simulated by a uniformly random r together with some local operation on the register of P,
the probability that Q(z, r, t,pi, a, b) = 1 is exactly the same for P and P′. This implies that
Pr
(
P′ is accepted in H11
)
> Pr
(
P is accepted in H10
)− negl(|x|) .
4.3 Reduction to [BJSW16]
Consider the following Hamiltonian:
H = H(Qn) + |0〉 〈0|clock ⊗∑
i
|xi〉 〈xi|instancei (5)
Notice that this is a local Clifford Hamiltonian (once the clock is expressed in unary). It is imme-
diate to verify that the protocol described in H11 is identical to an execution of the protocol from
[BJSW16] on common input H (see Section 2.2). By invoking the soundness of the [BJSW16] pro-
tocol, we deduce that protocol H11 is sound, and as a consequence of Lemma 4.3, protocol H0 (the
original protocol) is also sound. This concludes the soundness analysis.
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4.4 Parallel amplification of soundness
If Q = {Qn} is a family of quantum circuits that each return a single bit as output, for every k ≥ 1
we define Q(k) = {Q(k)n } where for every n, Q(k)n executes Qn k times in parallel and returns the
AND of their output bits.
Let Π = (S, P, V) be a non-interactive argument with setup. Let k ≥ 1 be an integer. We define
the k-th parallel repetition of Π, Π(k) = (S(k), P(k), V(k)) as follows:
• For every µ and n, S(k)µn executes k independent copies of Sµn and returns their outputs.
• For every µ and n, V(k)µn = (V(k)1,µn, V(k)2,µn) and P(k)µn = (P(k)1,µn, P(k)2,µn). V(k)1,µn and P(k)1,µn take as input
a classical string, interpreted as k outputs of Sµn. They execute k copies of V1,µn and P1,µn
respectively on the k inputs and they each produce a k-register quantum state as output.
V(k)2,µn takes as input the output of V
(k)
1,µn and an instance x. P
(k)
2,µn takes as input the output
of P(k)1,µn, x and a k-register quantum state ρ
(k). Each of them executes k copies of V2,µn and
P2,µn respectively, where the i-th copy of P2,µn is executed with the i-th register of ρ(k) as its
quantum input. V(k)µn returns 1 if and only if each copy of Vµn returns 1.
For classical non-interactive arguments (and more generally arguments of up to three rounds) it
is well-known that parallel repetition amplifies soundness exponentially [BIN97]. In our setting
the argument is made more delicate by the fact that the message sent from verifier to prover in the
setup phase is quantum. We do not know if parallel repetition amplifies soundness in a black-box
way for (quantum) non-interactive arguments with setup. However, using the specific structure
of our protocol we can give a tailored argument.
Lemma 4.5. Let (Q, α, β) be a QMA relation and Π = (S, P, V) the argument system for (Q, α, β)
described in Section 3. Let c and s be the completeness and soundness of the protocol respectively. Then for
any integer k ≥ 1, (S(k), P(k), V(k)) is an argument system for (Q(k), α, βk) with completeness 1− k(1− c)
and soundness s′, where s′ is negligibly close to sk.
Proof. Let k ≥ 1 and for ease of notation writeΠ′ = (S′, P′, K′) = (S(k), P(k), V(k)) and (Q′, α′, β′) =
(Q(k), α, βk). We also fix a µ and an integer n and omit the indices.
Completeness. Let (x, ρ) ∈ RQ′,α′ . Then by definition Q′ accepts ρ with probability at least α.
By definition of Q′ = Q(k), this implies that if ρi is the reduced density of ρ on the i-th register, Q
accepts ρi with probability at least α. By the completeness property ofΠ, (S, P(x, ρi), V(x)) returns
1 with probability at least c. By a union bound, (S′, P′(x, ρ), V ′(x)) returns 1 with probability at
least 1− k(1− c).
Soundness. For ease of notation we give the proof for k = 2, as the general case is similar.
Suppose for contradiction that there exists an x ∈ NQ′,β′ and a quantum polynomial-time P∗ such
that (S′, P∗(x), V ′(x)) returns 1 with probability non-negligibly larger than s′ = s2.
As a first step we show that there exists a P˜∗ that succeeds with probability non-negligibly larger
than s′ = s2 in an (interactive) hybrid variant H′2 of the protocol, that is identical to Hybrid H2
43
considered in the soundness proof (see Section 4.1), except for the following modifications: First,
the protocol described in H2 is executed twice in parallel. Second, at step (a) of H2, the prover is
expected to report, in addition to the commitments σi, valid openings (ti,pii, ai, bi) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
(The verifier checks that the openings are valid.) We let V˜ be the verifier in the hybrid H′2, and
denote by Π˜′ the resulting interactive protocol.
Claim 4.6. The maximum success probability of a prover in protocol Π′ and in protocol Π˜′ are negligibly
close.
Proof. The fact that the maximum success probability of a prover in H2 is negligibly close to that
in Π′ follows from the soundness analysis in Section 4.2, with straightforward modifications to
handle the parallel repetition.
Clearly, since the prover is asked for more information in H′2 than in H2 the maximum success
probability cannot increase. To show that it can only decrease negligibly, let P∗ be a prover that
succeeds in H2 with some probability, and consider the following prover P˜ for H′2.
P˜ first executes the setup phase with V˜ exactly as P∗ would. As a result, it obtains two CRS
(γ1, pkP,1, pkV,1) and (γ2, pkP,2, pkV,2) as well as two 2Np(n)-qubit states ρ1 and ρ2 and classical
information (pkE,1, σ1, α1) and (pkE,2, σ2, α2) from the preprocessing phase V˜1 of V˜.
Next, for i ∈ {1, 2} P˜ generates new CRS (γ˜i, p˜kP,i, p˜kV,i) such that γ˜i = γi and p˜kV,i = pkV,i but
p˜kP,i is sampled jointly with a secret key s˜kP,i for Comstat-bind using Comstat-bind.Gen(1
n).
In the instance-dependent interactive phase, after having received V˜2’s first message (encryptions
of 0), P˜ simulates P∗, except that it uses the new CRS in place of the older one. Receiving P∗’s
messages (di, σi) for i ∈ {1, 2}, P˜ uses s˜kP,i to open σi and sends (di, σi) together with the opening
(ti,pii, ai, bi) to the verifier.
Let P∗ be a prover with optimal success probability in H′2. Let p1 be the probability that the first
proof returned by P∗ is accepted by the first verifier, and p2 the probability that the second proof
is accepted, conditioned on the first one being accepted. Since the maximum success probability
in Π is s, it follows from (the single-repetition analogue of) Claim 4.6 that the maximum success
probability of any prover in the single-repetition analogue Π˜ of Π˜′ is at most neglibly higher than
s. By a straightforward simulation argument it follows that p1 is at most negligibly larger than s.
Applying Bayes’ rule, p2 is non-negligibly higher than s. In the remainder of the proof we derive a
contradiction by showing that there is an (efficient) P′ such that P′ succeeds in the single-repetition
hybrid Π˜ with probability negligibly close to p2.
Definition of P′. Let ρ2, m2 be respectively the quantum state and the classical message received
from V1 in the preprocessing phase. P′ independently simulates another execution of V1 and V2 to
obtain ρ1 and m1. Instead of executing directly P∗ on these inputs, it executes it on the state ρ1, but
the state ρ2 is replaced by half-EPR pairs.
Let (d′i, σi) and (ti,pii, ai, bi), for i ∈ {1, 2}, be the outcomes obtained from P∗. Note that at this
point P′ can already verify if the outcomes associated with the first repetition i = 1 will lead to
acceptance in the protocol, simply by running the simulated verifier one step forward to obtain
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(z1, r1, s1) and checking whether Q(t1,pi1, a1, b1, r1, z1, d1) = 1. If this is not the case, P′ repeats the
first part with a new execution of the setup phase V1 and fresh half-EPR pairs.
Suppose now that P′ has obtained (di, σi) and (ti,pii, ai, bi), for i ∈ {1, 2} from P∗ such that the
execution of the first copy of the verifier leads to acceptance.
To complete the protocol, P′ now performs a Bell basis measurement between the half-EPR pairs
not given to P∗ and the state ρ2, that until now has not been used. Let d′2 = (x′i , z
′
i) denote the
teleportation outcomes obtained. P′ then pursues the interaction with V2, except that it replaces
the outcome d2 = (xi, zi) obtained from P∗ by d2 ⊕ d′2 = (xi ⊕ x′i , zi ⊕ z′i). All other messages are
the same. This completes the description of P′.
Success probability of P′. To conclude we claim that P′ succeeds with probability non-negligibly
larger than s in Π˜. Note that the result of the “teleportation” operation performed by P′ is that the
prover P∗ is executed on the state (Xx′Zz′)ρ2(Xx
′
Zz
′
)† instead of the state ρ2. Since the state ρ2 is
obtained from half-EPR pairs that were prepared and measured by the verifier V1, the effect of this
one-time pad is identical to not modifying ρ2, but instead modifying the verifier’s measurement
outcomes z by XORing them with a string e′i defined as in (3) with (a, b) on the left-hand side
replaced by (x′, z′). Let z˜ be the modified outcomes. Using that by definition for any t,pi, a, b, r, d
it holds that
Q˜(t,pi, a, b, r, z˜, d) = Q˜(t,pi, a, b, r, z, d˜) ,
where d˜ is computed from d as done by P′ (described above), it follows that the simulation of P∗
that is performed by P′ is indistinguishable (from the point of view of P∗) of an actual execution of
protocol Π˜′. Furthermore, since P′ repeatedly executes P∗ until the first repetition of the protocol
accepts, the probability that P′ succeeds in its interaction with V2 is identical to the probability
that P∗ succeeds in the second repetition in Π˜′, conditioned on the first repetition succeeding.
This probability is exactly p2, which according to the discussion above is non-negligibly larger
than s. This is a contradiction and concludes the proof.
Lemma 4.7. Let (Q, α, β) be a QMA relation, and let Π = (S, P, V) be the argument system for (Q, α, β)
which is described in Section 3. Suppose that Π is computationally zero-knowledge with respect to any
quantum polynomial time verifier with (quantum) auxiliary input.7 Then Π(k) = (S(k), P(k), V(k)) is
also computationally zero-knowledge with respect to any quantum polynomial time verifier with quantum
auxiliary input.
Proof. Consider a single execution of Π(k), in which V∗(k), a potentially cheating verifier, outputs
k quantum messages, and receives k proofs in return:
7This will be proven in section 5.
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Figure 4: The first stage of the cheating verifier, V∗(k)0 , takes in an auxiliary input Z0 and outputs k
(quantum) setup messages e1, . . . , ek, each of which goes into one copy of P0. V
∗(k)
0 then communi-
cates with V∗(k)1 , the second stage of the cheating verifier, by sending an arbitrary quantum state
Z1. V
∗(k)
1 takes proofs pi1, . . . ,pik from the k copies of P1, along with Z1 from V
∗(k)
0 , and outputs an
arbitrary quantum state Z2.
Notice that Z1 is entirely independent of the behaviour of P(k). As such, in order to guarantee that
Z2 remains computationally indistinguishable from what it would be in a real execution of the
protocol, we need only simulate the following:
Figure 5: If we can create a simulation which takes in Z0 and outputs pi′1, . . . ,pi
′
k which are in-
distinguishable from pi1, . . . ,pik that arise from a real execution of the protocol, then we can also
simulate Figure 4.
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That Figure 5 is efficiently simulable follows directly from the fact that Π is zero-knowledge. The
simulator SΠ(k) would run V
∗(k)
0 on Z0 to obtain Z1, e1, . . . , ek, and then replace each of the k pairs
(Pi0, P
i
1), i ∈ {1, . . . , k} in the diagram above with a simulator Si (which is guaranteed to exist by
the auxiliary-input zero-knowledge property of Π).
Remark 4.8. Note that it is in general not possible to extend this simple argument to a multi-round proto-
col. The intuitive reason is that, in a multi-round protocol, the parallel instances of the protocol may depend
on each other, because the cheating verifier may introduce cross-correlations. More formally, the assumption
we made that the internal communications of the cheating verifier do not depend on the behaviour of P(k) is
false if the protocol is multi-round.
5 Zero-knowledge property
Lemma 5.1. Let V = {Vµn} be an arbitrary quantum polynomial time (QPT) verifier for the protocol
of Section 3. There exists a QPT simulator S = {Sµn} such that, for any µ, n and yes-instance x with
|x| = n, and for any auxiliary quantum input Z0 to the verifier, the distribution of V’s final output after
its interaction with the honest prover P in the protocol is quantum computationally indistinguishable from
S’s output distribution on auxiliary input Z0.
We show that our protocol is zero-knowledge by replacing the components of the honest prover
with components of a simulator one at a time, and demonstrating that, when the input is a yes-
instance, the dishonest verifier’s output after each replacement is made is at the least computa-
tionally indistinguishable from its output before. The end result, after all replacements have been
made, is an efficient simulation which does not require access to the witness ρ. The proof follows
an outline that is similar to that of the proof of zero-knowledge in [BJSW16]. We emphasise those
aspects of our proof which do not appear in the proof of zero-knowledge in [BJSW16], and refer
the reader to [BJSW16, Section 5] for a more detailed exposition of the steps that the two proofs
share.
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5.1 The original protocol
Figure 6: Diagram representing the original protocol. Communications between verifier and
prover are labelled in orange; internal communications on either side are labelled in grey. In the
two subsequent diagrams, we will omit the auxiliary input Z0 that the cheating verifier receives, as
well as the internal communications Z1, Z2, Z3 between the different parts of the cheating verifier.
(Note, however, that the auxiliary input Z0 and these internal communications make a reappear-
ance in Figure 9.) In the two subsequent diagrams, we will highlight replacements in green.
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5.2 Replacing the NP proof and the commitment
Figure 7: Figure 6 after the NIZK NP proof has been replaced by a simulation, and the commitment
z has been replaced by a commitment to a fixed string.
We replace the interaction between P4 and V4 with the entities Q and S4. (Recall that P4 is the
part of the prover which executes steps 4 and 5 in Figure 3, and that V4 is the part of the verifier
which is meant to perform the ‘verifier’s check’ described in the same figure.) Q is an entity which
evaluates the predicate Q (see Definition 3.5 for the definition of the predicate Q) homomorphi-
cally, and outputs an encryption of the result, which is either 0 or 1. S4 takes in Q’s output, and
homomorphically does one of two things. If the output of Q is (homomorphically) 0, S4 runs V4
on an encryption of the abort symbol. If the output of Q is homomorphically 1, then S4 homo-
morphically runs the simulation that is guaranteed to exist by the zero-knowledge property of the
NIZK NP proof system that V4 and P4 use. From the simulation, S4 obtains an encryption of a
bogus (simulated) proof that is computationally indistinguishable from a real proof. S4 then runs
V4 with this encryption of a simulated proof as input. (In each case, S4 ensures circuit privacy by
refreshing the ciphertext that it puts into V4 using FHE.Refresh. See section 2.3.1 for a definition of
FHE.Refresh and its properties.)
We argue that V4’s output after this replacement occurs is computationally indistinguishable from
its output before. In the original protocol, P4 homomorphically evaluates the predicate Q to check
that it is satisfied, and if it is, P4 provides an encryption of a zero-knowledge proof to V4 of
the NP statement ‘There exists a commitment string sP and an encoding key (pi, a, b) such that
c = Com.commit(pk, (pi, a, b), sP) and Q(t,pi, a, b, r, z, d) = 1.’ (We are guaranteed that this en-
cryption of a zero-knowledge proof, generated by P4 through a homomorphic computation, is
indistinguishable from a fresh encryption of the proof, by the circuit privacy property of the FHE
scheme in use.) Let S be the predicate that is 1 if and only if the NP statement ‘There exists a com-
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mitment string sP...’ is true. Then, because P4 is honest, S is satisfied whenever Q is satisfied; and,
by definition, Q is satisfied whenever S is satisfied. Therefore, if the simulation S4 aborts if and
only if Q is not satisfied, S4 will abort exactly when P4 would have aborted. When Q is satisfied,
meanwhile, the bogus proof that the simulation of P4 generates is computationally indistinguish-
able from a real yes-instance proof produced by P4, by the (adaptive) zero-knowledge property of
the NIZK NP proof system in the presence of auxiliary input which was shown in section 2.5.3.
Furthermore, by the circuit privacy property of the FHE scheme in use, we are guaranteed that
the encryptions generated by P4 and by S4 are both indistinguishable from fresh encryptions of,
respectively, the real proof and the bogus proof. Therefore, V4 (being efficient) is computationally
unable to distinguish between P4 and the combination of Q and S4, which means its output after
the replacement occurs must be computationally indistinguishable from its output before.
Having made this first replacement (i.e. turning P4 and V4 into Q and S4), we can then replace the
commitment c with a commitment to a fixed encoding key (pi0, a0, b0) that is independent of the
problem instance. The reasoning that justifies this replacement is the same as in [BJSW16, Section
5, step 3]: because the commitment is computationally hiding, and because it is never opened
after the NP proof has been replaced by a simulation, the real commitment c is computationally
indistinguishable from c′ = Com.commit(pk, (pi0, a0, b0), sP) to all of the entities in the diagram
above, given that all of said entities are quantum polynomial-time. As such, after both replace-
ments have been made, the output of S4 is computationally indistinguishable from the output of
V4 in the original protocol.
5.3 Replacing ρ with ρr
We now claim that, if we replace the real witness ρ with a simulated witness ρr in Figure 7, S4’s
output is computationally indistinguishable from what it was in Figure 7. (This claim holds re-
gardless of the verifier’s choice of r.) The simulated witness ρr is a state that, given r, can be
efficiently constructed.
For the remainder of section 5.3, we assume that r is chosen and published by the verifier before
the witness-dependent part of the protocol begins, so that r is fixed and known to all entities which
make use of it (such as Q). Although this is, in the real world, untrue—in the real protocol, the ver-
ifier only sends a commitment to r, which hides the true value of r from the prover—we will show
in section 5.4 that the simulator can extract r from the verifier’s perfectly binding commitment, so
that the effect is the same (for the simulator, not the real prover) as if the verifier had published r.
5.3.1 Pauli-twirling the verifier
Recall that P3 is the part of the prover which receives the witness ρ, applies an encoding to ρ,
and then teleports E(ρ) to the verifier. In order to facilitate the analysis, we firstly separate the
action of P3 from Figure 7 into two parts: we make applying the encoding E the responsibility of
a separate entity labelled E, and delegate the remainder of P3’s actions to a new entity P′3. Since P3
was honest, this replacement results in no change in the output of S4.
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Figure 8: E represents a procedure that samples an encoding key from the same distribution from
which P3 would have sampled its encoding key in Figure 7, applies the encoding represented by
that key to ρ, and sends the encoded ρ to P3 and the key it chose to Q. Because P3 was honest,
the output distribution of S4 in this diagram is exactly the same as the output distribution of S4 in
Figure 7.
Now, we consider (V1, P1), (V2, P2), (V3, P′3) taken together to be a cheating verifier V ′:
Figure 9: V ′ receives the encoded witness, E(ρ), along with auxiliary information Z0. It sends
some arbitrary auxiliary Z3 to S4, and also sends d = (a′, b′) and the homomorphic encryptions of
z, r to Q. Q receives its other inputs from E.
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We will now make a series of simplifications to Figure 9 such that, after each simplification, the
distribution of Z4 is statistically indistinguishable from what it was before the simplification.
Firstly, consider the region of Figure 9 inside the orange box, taken together with
1. the last step involved in applying E (that is, the application of the Pauli one-time-pad XaZb),
2. the additional one-time-pad applied by the prover’s teleportation that resulted in d (which
is Xa
′
Zb
′
), and
3. the first step involved in calculating Q (which is to ‘undo’ the Pauli one-time-pad Xa⊕a′Zb⊕b′ ,
keeping in mind that the honest verifier would have applied Cr transversally in the interim).
Let e, f be the unique strings such that Xa⊕a′Zb⊕b′ = CrXeZ f C∗r . Recall that V2 (of Figure 8 and
earlier) provided a proof that the string which we have called EncpkE(z, r) is in fact a valid encryp-
tion under pkE of some message (z, r). (For notational simplicity, we will from now until the end
of this section omit the subscript E when we refer to the public key for FHE.) We assume the proof
has negligible soundness error. If the prover P2 accepted that proof, then (except with negligible
probability) there exists a process V˜ ′ and a process E˜ncpk (the latter of which samples randomness
of encryption from some well-defined, though not necessarily efficiently sampleable, distribution)
such that the figure below is equivalent to the contents of the orange box in Figure 9 plus the last
step of E, the prover’s teleportation one-time-pad, and the first step of Q:
Figure 10: E1 denotes the application of the first three steps of the encoding E. The last Xe opera-
tion is shown in to indicate that it is applied homomorphically on an encrypted input. We emphasise
that E˜ncpk is not an arbitrary operation: due to the zero-knowledge proof that V2 provides, its ac-
tion is certainly to encrypt the input on the bottom wire under the encryption key pk. The only
freedom it has is to sample the randomness of encryption from some arbitrary distribution, which
may depend upon the auxiliary input Z0.
By the correctness property of the homomorphic encryption scheme, Figure 10 is equivalent to the
below (for some E˜nc
′
pk that may be different from E˜ncpk):
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Figure 11: Note that the application of Xe is no longer homomorphic.
Following [BJSW16], we merge the operation C∗r into V˜ ′, and apply a Pauli twirl in order to limit
the action of V˜ ′ to an XOR attack which does not depend on the state in the lower wire:
Figure 12: That which remains of the cheating verifier after the Pauli twirl is represented by the
box V˜ ′′, shown on the left. We have ‘zoomed out’ to show the entities into which the output wires
in Figure 11 are fed. R represents the procedure that evaluates the remainder of Q (‘the remainder’
being that part of Q which remains after the correction Xe has already been made). S′4 represents
the entity, described in section 5.2, which homomorphically runs a simulation of the NP ZK proof
system in order to obtain a simulated proof. The two boxes Decsk and Enc∗pk make explicit the fact
that the ciphertext (i.e. the encryption of the simulated proof obtained by S′4) is ‘refreshed’ before
it is fed into V4. Enc∗ is defined in section 2.3.1; its chief property is that it samples randomness of
encryption from some known distribution.
Using again the correctness property of the homomorphic encryption, we can ‘commute’ the boxes
with purple text in the diagram above past Decsk and turn them into boxes with black text. (Recall
that boxes with purple text represent circuits that are evaluated homomorphically, and boxes with
black text represent circuits evaluated in the clear.)
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Figure 13: R and S′4 have been ‘commuted’ past Decsk.
Notice now that any action which E˜ncpk might have had on the lower wire is entirely cancelled by
the Decsk that follows it, since the state of the wire before and after the action of both boxes is w.
We can therefore reduce E˜ncpk to its action on the upper wire, and then merge its residual action
into that of the cheating verifier V˜ ′′.
Since Figure 13 is equivalent to (a subset of) Figure 9, it suffices to show that the output of Encpk
in Figure 13 when E1(ρr) is fed in on the left (statistically) indistinguishable from its output when
E1(ρ) is fed in on the left. This statement is implied by the statement that the output of R in Figure
13 when E1(ρr) is fed in on the left (statistically) indistinguishable from its output when E1(ρ) is
fed in on the left. If we can show the latter, then we can substitute Figure 13 back into Figure 9, and
conclude that—by the statistical indistinguishability which the preceding argument has proven—
the verifier’s final output Z4 when ρr is used is statistically indistinguishable from its output when
the real witness ρ is used.
As such, it suffices to show that the output of Rr (we have made the fact that r is fixed at the start of
the protocol explicit now) in Figure 14 when ρr is given as input is (statistically) indistinguishable
from its output when ρ is given as input.
Figure 14: It is sufficient to argue that the output of Rr when ξ = ρr and when ξ = ρ are statistically
indistinguishable.
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5.3.2 Reducing to [BJSW16]
Figure 14 is identical to Figure 11 from [BJSW16]. As such, we can apply step 6 of their zero-
knowledge proof, almost in a black-box fashion, in order to argue that the output of Rr when
ξ = ρr is statistically indistinguishable from its output when ξ = ρ.
One difference between their situation and ours of which we must be mindful is that our Hamil-
tonian (effectively) includes one extra term designed to check the registers of the witness state in
which the prover is supposed to put a classical description of the instance. When any other term
in our Hamiltonian is selected according to r, our predicate Rr can be defined as Rr(t,pi, u) =
R˜r(t,pi, u), where R˜r is the predicate known as Rr in [BJSW16]. As such, in these cases, the argu-
ment in step 6 of [BJSW16, Section 5] applies verbatim. In the case when the special instance-check
term is selected, the translation between our Rr and theirs is not so direct, but the substance of their
argument is not affected. It is still true that, in order to change the logical meaning of u, the verifier
must apply an XOR attack of large Hamming weight, with the result that the probability its XOR
attack goes undetected by the traps t becomes negligibly small. As such, even though the specific
form of the correctness check condition (condition (a) in Definition 2.1 and condition 1. in Defini-
tion 3.2) is different when the instance-check term from our Hamiltonian is selected, the argument
made in step 6 of [BJSW16] still holds.
It follows from the argument in [BJSW16], then, that when ρ in Figure 8 is replaced by ρr, where
ρr is a state that passes the particular challenge determined by r with probability 1, the output of
S4 is computationally indistinguishable from what it was before the replacement occurred. ρr in
our case can be constructed efficiently, just as it can be in the [BJSW16] protocol: for those rs that
do not correspond with the instance check term, ρr is the same that it would be in the [BJSW16]
protocol, and for those rs that do correspond with the instance check term, a state which had the
correct instance description in the relevant registers and the state |0〉 on all other qubits would
pass with probability 1.
5.4 Feasibility of the ρ→ ρr replacement
It remains only to argue that, as we claimed at the start of section 5.3, the simulator can efficiently
extract r from the verifier’s commitment to r. (We assume the latter to be perfectly binding, so that,
conditioned on the prover accepting when it checks the verifier’s commitment homomorphically,
r is well-defined.) The simulator does this by taking advantage of the CRS. The verifier expects as
input a CRS which contains in it the public key pkV that it is to use for the commitment scheme
Com. We assume, however, that Com is extractable (see section 2.3.2), meaning that every valid
public key for Com has a corresponding secret key skV such that the efficient algorithm Com.recover
can, given skV and a commitment z = Com.commit(pkV , b, s), recover (b, s) from z. Then, in order
to extract r, the simulator simply samples a public key, secret key pair (pk∗V , sk
∗
V) ← Com.gen;
inserts pk∗V into the CRS when it gives the verifier the CRS as input; and recovers r from the
verifier’s commitment to r using Com.recover and sk∗V .
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6 NIZK argument of quantum knowledge with setup for QMA
In this section we show that for any QMA relation the NIZK argument system with CRS setup
described in section 3 is also a NIZK Argument of Quantum Knowledge with CRS setup (as de-
fined in section 2.6). The intuition for this is simple. From the proof of soundness of the protocol
from [BJSW16], to which soundness of our argument system reduces, we are able to infer that any
prover which is accepted in our protocol with high probability must be teleporting to the verifier
an encoding of a low-energy witness state for the given instance of the 5-local Clifford Hamiltonian
problem. Then, all that an extractor (given oracle access to such a prover) has to do in order to
output a good witness is:
• Simulate an honest verifier so as to receive (by teleportation) such an encoded witness from
the prover,
• Find a way to recover the committed encoding keys and use them to decode the received
state.
The extractor recovers the keys by using the same technique used multiple times in the sound-
ness proof of section 4. Namely, the extractor samples a CRS which includes a public key for the
prover’s commitment scheme for which it knows the associated secret key. The distribution of
such CRS is identical to the true distribution, but the additional side information allows the ex-
tractor to recover the authentication keys once the prover sends his commitment. In the rest of
this section, we formalize this sketch.
The following lemma, that is a direct consequence of the soundness proof in [BJSW16], will be
useful in the analysis.
Lemma 6.1. For any N ∈N there exists an efficiently implementable quantum channel Φ from 2N qubits
to 1 such that the following holds for any 5-local Clifford Hamiltonian H on n qubits: let P be a prover for
the protocol of [BJSW16] (where N is the number of physical qubits per logical qubit in the concatenated
Steane code), and suppose P is accepted with probability p on common input H. Let ∑σ pσρσ ⊗ |σ〉 〈σ| be
the state of the message register of P after the first round. Assume ∑σ is valid pσ = 1. Let ξσ be the state
obtained from ρσ after applying the decoding map Dect,pi,a,b (from Definition 2.3), where t,pi, a, b are the
values committed in σ. Let ξ = ∑σ pσξσ. Then
Tr[HΦ⊗n(ξ)] < 1− p + negl(n) .
Consider a QMA relation (Q, α, β) with α− β > 1/poly and the language L ∈ QMA that it spec-
ifies. Given an instance x for the associated decision promise problem, let H(x) be an instance
of the (QMA-complete) 5-local Clifford Hamiltonian problem that is associated to it. We assume
without loss of generality that for all x ∈ L, there exists a state σ such that Tr(H(x)σ) < negl(|x|).
Moreover, there exists γ = 1/ poly such that for all x /∈ L, for all σ, Tr(H(x)σ) > γ(|x|). This
reduction has the property that there exists an efficiently implementable unitary U which maps a
witness state for x, tensored with some auxiliary qubits in the state |0t〉 for some t, to a witness
state for H(x). Let τ be the efficiently implementable quantum channel that takes as input a state
σ, applies U−1 and traces out the auxiliary qubits. It is not hard to verify from the history state
construction used to obtain the witness for H(x) from a witness for x that the map τ has the prop-
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erty that there exists a universal polynomial t such that whenever Tr(H(x)σ) ≤ 1− ε for some
state σ and ε ≤ 1, it holds that (x, τ(σ)) ∈ RQ,1−poly((1−ε)t).
We are ready to state the main result of this section. For simplicity we only consider relations
(Q, α, β) such that α = 1− negl(n) and β = negl(n); by [MW05] any relation can be amplified to
such parameters without changing the witness for the case of a yes instance.
Theorem 6.2. Let (Q, 1− negl(n), negl(n)) be a QMA relation. There is a polynomial t such that the
following hold. There is a NIZK Argument of Quantum Knowledge with CRS setup and single-message
preprocessing for (Q, α, β)with completeness 1−negl, soundness s (where s is the soundness from Thereom
3.6), knowledge error 1− 12t and quality q(n, ε) = 1− poly((1− ε)t(n)).
Proof. Let (Q, 1− negl(n), negl(n)) be a QMA relation. We prove that the argument system with
CRS setup from section 3 is also an argument of Quantum Knowledge with CRS setup. We de-
scribe an extractor K. Fix an instance x and a prover P′ that is accepted with probability p > 1− 12t
in the protocol of section 3 on common input x. At a high level, K does the following:
1. K uses P′ to construct a prover P′′ for the protocol of [BJSW16]. The crucial part is that K is
able to know the authentication keys that P′′ commits to.
2. K runs P′′ and obtains a state ρ of 2nN qubits and a commitment σ. Let (t,pi, a, b) be the
committed keys. K outputs Φ⊗n(Dect,pi,a,b(ρ)).
In more detail, the hybrid argument in section 4 implies that there exists an efficient A such that
A|P′〉 is accepted with probability at least p − negl(|x|) in the protocol from hybrid H11, i.e. the
protocol from [BJSW16]. In particular, the prover reduction in the last replacement H10 ≈ H11
implies that we can choose A such that after the first step of the instance-dependent part of the
protocol the state of A|P′〉 is (where the first two registers are message registers and the third
register is an internal register):
∑
σ
pσ ρσ ⊗ |σ〉 〈σ| ⊗ |(t,pi, a, b)σ〉 〈(t,pi, a, b)σ| , (6)
where (t,pi, a, b)σ is the value committed in σ, and all σ’s that appear in the sum are valid commit-
ments. The extractor K runs A|P′〉 to obtain (6), and efficiently maps this to Ξ = ∑σ pσΦ⊗nDect,pi,a,b(ρσ).
Since A|P′〉 is accepted with probability at least p− negl(|x|) in the protocol of [BJSW16], Lemma
6.1 implies that Ξ satisfies Tr(H(x)Ξ) < 1− p+negl(|x|). The final output of the extractor is τ(Ξ),
where τ is the efficiently implementable channel defined at the start of this section. The claim on
the quality of K follows from the property of τ stated below Lemma 6.1.
Remark 6.3. Notice that K succeeds at extracting with probability 1. This is perhaps surprising given
that the only known zero-knowledge proofs or arguments of knowledge for NP in the quantum settting
[Unr12] have an extractor that only succeeds with inverse-polynomial probability. Here, our argument
is non-interactive and it works for QMA! The main difference, which grants the additional power to the
extractor, is the presence of the CRS setup.
Remark 6.4. The knowledge error in Theorem 6.2 is 1− 1/poly. This can reduced to negligible by se-
quential repetition according to Lemma 2.26, but this would forego non-interactiveness. We believe that
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starting from the parallel amplified version of our protocol from section 4.4, it should be possible to obtain
a non-interactive argument of knowledge with negligible knowledge error, but we leave a more thorough
investigation of this for future work.
7 Proofs of quantum knowledge for QMA
The interactive protocol that we show is a proof of quantum knowledge is identical to the protocol
from [BJSW16], as recalled in Section 2.2, except for one modification: at the same time as the
prover sends the encoded state E(ρ) and the commitment σ to the verifier (end of step 1 of the
protocol), the prover also sends a classical zero-knowledge PoK of an opening to the commitment.
More precisely, define a relation R such that R(σ, z) = 1 if z is a valid opening for the commitment
σ. V and P engage in a ZK PoK protocol for the relation R on common input σ, as defined in
Definition 2.20. If the verifier rejects in this protocol, then the verifier outputs “reject” for the
whole protocol; otherwise the verifier proceeds to the next phase.
We denote by ΠPoK the ZK PoK protocol for relation R. Using [Unr12, Corollary 21], we may
assume that this protocol has negligible knowledge error.
The main result of this section is that with this modification, the protocol from [BJSW16] is a
quantum proof of quantum knowledge for any language in QMA. As in Section 6 for simplicity
we only consider relations (Q, α, β) such that α = 1− negl(n) and β = negl(n).
Theorem 7.1. There is a polynomial t such that the following holds. Let (Q, 1− negl(n), negl(n)) be a
QMA relation. There is a Zero-Knowledge PoQK for (Q, 1− negl(n), negl(n)) with completeness 1−
negl(n), negligible soundness and knowledge error, and quality q(n, ε) = 1− poly((1− ε)t(n)).
Proof. Given a QMA relation (Q, 1− negl(n), negl(n)) and an instance x, as in Section 6 we can
efficiently construct a 5-local Clifford Hamiltonian H(x) and an efficient quantum channel τ such
that there is a polynomial t such that for any state ρ such that Tr(Hρ) ≤ ε it holds that (x, τ(ρ)) ∈
RQ,1−poly(εt). We then consider the protocol from [BJSW16] for the Hamiltonian H(x), modified
as described at the start of the section. Completeness holds trivially. Provided t is chosen large
enough, the soundness error is at most 1 − 1/t. We first show that the knowledge error is at
most 1− 1/(2t). Using Lemma 2.6.1, both soundness and knowledge error can be improved by
sequential repetition.
The Zero-Knowledge property follows essentially as in [BJSW16], with the only difference being
the addition of the quantum zero-knowledge PoK of an opening to the commitment, that also has
the Zero-Knowledge property.
We show that the protocol is a quantum proof of quantum knowledge by constructing an extractor
K as follows. Let P∗ be an arbitrary (quantum polynomial-time) prover in the protocol, and (x, ρ) a
pair of a problem instance and a quantum witness such that the protocol execution (P∗(x, ρ), V(x))
returns 1 with probability at least 1− s for some s ≤ min{1/t, 1/2}.
Informally, the extractor K first takes the quantum state ρ∗ sent by P∗ in the first message. It then
executes an extractor K′ for an opening to the commitment sent in the first message, that must exist
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by the quantum proof of knowledge property for the sub-protocol. If K′ succeeds in recovering
the committed keys, K decodes the state received in the first message using these keys and returns
the decoded state. Otherwise, K returns an abort symbol “⊥”.
We provide more detail. Denote by N and SP the message and state registers of P respectively.
Initially, SP contains the witness ρ and N is initialized to a zero string. Let UP be the unitary
applied by the prover at the first step of the protocol. (For simplicity, we omit dependence on the
instance x.)
The extractor K operates as follows. (In the following description, we sometimes write for simplic-
ity that “K measures a certain register”. Formally, however, K does not perform any measurement,
and what we mean is that K uses its auxiliary register SKaux to implement the channel correspond-
ing to these measurements in a coherent way.)
(i) K executes UP on registers N and SP. Subsequently, K swaps the first 2nN qubits of N (the
ones that the prover would have sent to the verifier) in an auxiliary register SKq , and the
qubits corresponding to the “commitment” into an auxiliary register SKc . K measures SKc to
obtain a string σ.
(ii) Denote by ρ˜ the state of SKq . Let ρ
′ be the leftover state of register SP. Let K′ be the knowledge
extractor for ΠQPoK. K executes K′ on the remaining registers of the prover to obtain an
outcome z. If R(σ, z) = 1 then K proceeds to the next step. Otherwise K halts with the
outcome “⊥” on its output register.
(iii) Let the opened commitment be z = (t,pi, a, b). K applies the map Dect,pi,a,b from Defini-
tion 2.3 to the state ρ˜ contained in register SKq , followed by the channelΦ
⊗n from Lemma 6.1,
followed by the map τ described at the start of the proof. K returns the resulting n-qubit state
in its output register.
We show that K is a valid extractor for the PoQK property. First note that the state of SKq ⊗ SKc
after step (i), conditioned on not returning “⊥”, takes the form
∑
v
pσ ρσ ⊗ |σ〉〈σ| , (7)
where each σ is a valid commitment. Let 1− s(σ) be the probability that V accepts P in the proto-
col, conditioned on V having received commitment σ. Then ∑σ pσs(σ) ≤ s. Let p, q be a polyno-
mials such that K′ succeeds at extracting an opening for a valid commitment with probability at
least 1q(µ) p(1− s(σ)). Denote by ξσ the state returned by the verifier at step (iii) prior to applying
the map τ, when the commitment is σ and conditioned on the extraction performed by K′ having
succeeded. Thus as long as s(σ) < 1 (which implies that σ is a valid commitment), the probability
that the prover is eventually accepted in the protocol, conditioned on having given commitment
σ and the extraction having succeeded is at least 1− s(σ)q(µ)p(1−s(σ)) . Applying Lemma 6.1, we get
Tr
(
Hξσ
) ≤ s(σ)q(µ)
p(1− s(σ)) + negl(n) .
By Markov’s inequality, a fraction at least 1/2 (under the distribution (pσ)) of commitments σ are
such that sσ ≤ 2s. For any such σ, conditioned on the extraction performed by K′ succeeding, K
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obtains a state such that Tr(Hξσ) < 2sq(µ)/p(1− 2s) + negl(n). By the discussion at the start of
the proof, in any such case the extractor returns τ(ξσ) such that (x, τ(ξσ)) ∈ RQ,1−poly(2stq/p(1−2s)).
To obtain the desired conclusion, we combine the polynomials q and t.
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